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ABSTRACT
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code allows financially dis-
tressed businesses to reorganize and emerge from bankruptcy free of
their pre-bankruptcy debts and obligations. In general, a business
can achieve this kind of “fresh start” by confirming a plan of reorg-
anization or pursuing a going-concern sale that typically facilitates
a change in ownership, a reduction in leverage, and the elimination
of most claims against the company’s assets. Through these kinds of
transactions, a business can emerge from bankruptcy with a stronger
balance sheet and often a new ownership structure. It also can
streamline operations by, for example, assuming valuable contracts
and rejecting burdensome ones under the relevant provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. Although creditors’ claims may lose value through
the bankruptcy process, all similarly situated creditors are treated
fairly and in a nondiscriminatory manner.
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Distressed companies and their creditors should not have to worry
about variances in state law insolvency schemes that might facilitate
similar going-concern sales, but treat creditors differently or allow
a process without the same kind of court or creditor oversight. Yet,
states are increasingly adopting debtor-creditor laws that mimic key
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and permit the kind of fresh start
for business debtors historically available only under federal bank-
ruptcy law. These state laws may also provide rights or distributions
to creditors that differ from, and conflict with, the provisions and
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. These new, sweeping state law
insolvency schemes raise serious constitutional questions under both
the Bankruptcy Clause and the Contract Clause. Policymakers and
courts need to rethink and rebalance the allocation of powers between
Congress and the states with respect to bankruptcy laws. More specif-
ically, they need to define more clearly the parameters of federal
preemption and preserve Congress’s exclusive authority over laws
affecting the rights of creditors and other stakeholders in the context
of a fresh start for business debtors.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of federal preemption is easy to articulate: laws
enacted by Congress supersede similar or conflicting state laws
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.1 It often is,
however, difficult to implement. For example, Congress has the
power under the Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution to
enact uniform laws governing bankruptcy.2 Nonetheless, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that certain state laws governing debtors’
and creditors’ rights may coexist with legislation enacted by Con-
gress under the Bankruptcy Clause.3 Some state and lower federal
courts have extended this rationale to state laws that mimic, and in
some instances conflict with, various provisions of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code. These provisions include the automatic stay of section
362 of the Bankruptcy Code;4 a trustee’s ability to assume or reject
executory contracts and unexpired leases under section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code;5 and a trustee’s ability to sell a debtor’s assets as
an operating entity (or going concern) free of all liens and interests
under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.6 Are these extensions
warranted? Are they consistent with the Bankruptcy Clause, the
Contract Clause, and Congress’s intent in enacting the Bankruptcy
Code?
Although states are increasingly refining their debtor-creditor
laws to look more like mini Bankruptcy Codes, few scholars have
analyzed the legitimacy or policy implications of this trend.7 But
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land.”).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4 (“The Congress shall have Power To ... establish ...
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”).
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
5. Id. § 365.
6. Id. § 363; see also infra Part II.B.
7. For a thoughtful empirical analysis of the use of assignments for the benefit of cred-
itors and the potential implications of increasing reliance on state law remedies, see Andrew
B. Dawson, Better than Bankruptcy?, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 137 (2016); see also Ronald J.
Mann, An Empirical Investigation of Liquidation Choices of Failed High Tech Firms, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 1375 (2004) (studying the use of assignments for the benefit of creditors under
California law and noting efficiencies in that process for certain kinds of distressed
businesses); Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts
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these issues have never been more relevant or important to finan-
cially distressed companies and their creditors.8 As even the small-
est of businesses now conduct operations on an interstate and global
and State Law, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 299-300 (2009) (studying distressed small businesses
and their use of state versus federal law for resolving distress, suggesting that state law may
provide a more effective resolution in many instances, and positing that “policy makers should
consider relaxing federal preemption doctrine in this area”). In addition, many practitioners
have written about the state law options available to distressed businesses, often suggesting
that such options are more effective and cost-efficient. See, e.g., Peter C. Blain, The Rise of
Receiverships (and the Decline of Chapter 11), in CREDITORS’ RIGHTS IN CHAPTER 11 CASES:
LEADING LAWYERS ON REPRESENTING AND ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF CREDITORS IN
BANKRUPTCY MATTERS, ASPATORE, 2016 WL 1105299, at *2 (2016); Mary Jo Heston,
Alternatives to Bankruptcy: Receiverships, Assignments for Benefit of Creditors, and Informal
Workout Arrangements, in ADAPTING TO CHANGES IN BANKRUPTCY LAW: LEADING LAWYERS ON
UNDERSTANDING RECENT BANKRUPTCY TRENDS, ANALYZING CHANGING LAWS, AND DEVELOPING
CLIENT STRATEGIES, ASPATORE, 2009 WL 4052825, at *6-7 (2009); David S. Kupetz,
Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors: Effective Tool for Acquiring and Winding up Distressed
Businesses, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov. 2015. But see Edward T. Gavin, How to Lessen the Big Costs
of Small-Business Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2016, at 12 (noting potential issues
with state insolvency laws as alternative to bankruptcy, at least in certain instances); Paul
A. Lucey, The Liquidating “Chapter 11” in State Court, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2001, at 12
(same). As discussed more fully at Part III, this Article considers a more robust application
of the preemption doctrine in accordance with the U.S. Constitution, but it also acknowledges
a continuing and meaningful role for state debtor-creditor laws.
8. Although state debtor-creditor laws may offer certain advantages for smaller
distressed businesses in certain instances, they also lack the transparency, structure, and
certainty of federal bankruptcy law. For example, unsecured creditors may not be involved
in the decision to file a state law proceeding and may not have the financial sophistication or
wherewithal to participate in the proceeding or to file an involuntary bankruptcy case to stop
the proceeding. See Michelle M. Harner, Are Small- and Medium-Sized Companies Worth
Saving?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July 2015, at 8 (“[State law] processes serve some distressed
companies and their creditors well, facilitating liquidations or foreclosure sales, usually in a
manner that is faster and less expensive than bankruptcy. They also may help a distressed
SME save its business (e.g., an SME owner may buy back the assets or start over), but this
result may come at a potentially significant cost in relationships, as unsecured creditors
(including vendors and customers) rarely receive any meaningful recovery in these proceed-
ings.”). Federal bankruptcy law, on the other hand, is a very transparent process that offers
extensive notice and due process to all creditors, including unsecured and involuntary (for
example, tort claimants) creditors. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 7, at 1443 (concluding that
state systems like California’s assignment for the benefit of creditors process could increase
efficiencies for certain distressed small businesses, but adding “[t]he major caveat ... that the
system needs to be at once attentive to the possibility of abuse and at the same time
sufficiently streamlined to be attractive to the failed firms”); Morrison, supra note 7, at 297-98
(noting the potential for “collusion among senior creditors and business owners” to the
detriment of junior creditors in state law proceedings and that “this dynamic will induce
junior creditors to restrict or raise the price of credit”); see also infra notes 348-49 and
accompanying text.
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basis, through the Internet and online platforms, parties need uni-
form and consistent bankruptcy laws.9
Consider the following scenario: a company experiences a liquid-
ity crisis—it simply cannot pay its ongoing obligations from current
cash flows, and creditors’ demands for payment or security of pay-
ment are increasing by the day. Traditionally, that company had
several options: it could file a federal bankruptcy case,10 seek to
achieve an out-of-court consensual workout with its creditors,11 or
subject itself to a state law remedy (such as an assignment for the
benefit of creditors or a receivership) that would liquidate the com-
pany’s assets to satisfy creditors’ claims.12 Each option provided
slightly different advantages and disadvantages to the company and
its creditors, as discussed more fully in Part II. Nevertheless, these
distinctions have essentially disappeared, as companies exercise
different means for reorganizing under federal bankruptcy laws,
and as states have refined their debtor-creditor laws to mimic the
relief available to companies under the Bankruptcy Code.13 Conse-
quently, the company in our hypothetical could file a federal bank-
ruptcy case, commence an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or
consent to the filing of a state law receivership and achieve the
same result. All options would result in a sale of the business free
of all creditors’ claims with the assumption, assignment, and rejec-
tion of contracts and leases on a nonconsensual basis. This result
allows a continuation of the distressed company’s business free of
legacy costs and other pre-filing obligations.14
9. See Gavin, supra note 7, at 7 (noting potential issues with state insolvency laws, “plus
the lack of transparency, slower pace and the state-by-state variations found in nonbankrupt-
cy alternatives, increase risk and complexity, often leading to a less-desirable result when
compared to chapter 11”); Harner, supra note 8, at 8 (“Moreover, from the creditors’ perspec-
tive, receiverships and ABCs vary, sometimes greatly, from state to state. Even SMEs have
multi-state operations, and state law remedies may prove inefficient in such situations.”); see
also infra Part III.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
13. As described below, chapter 11 debtors no longer reorganize solely through a plan of
reorganization, but also effect change of control reorganizations through going-concern sales
under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. The latter reorganization strategy also may now
be accomplished under certain enhanced state debtor-creditor laws. See infra Part II.
14. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
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Under Supreme Court decisions considering preemption issues in
the bankruptcy context, a guiding consideration is whether the state
law at issue provides the debtor with a discharge and frees “future
acquired property from the obligation of existing debts.”15 An ap-
proach focused only on a statutory “discharge” ignores fundamental
policies underlying the Bankruptcy Clause and arguably would
validate the state law in our hypothetical scenario—a state law that
has the effect of a discharge without being so labeled. That state law
also may provide parties with different rights and remedies than
federal bankruptcy law.16 State law rights and processes that differ
from, and conflict with, the Bankruptcy Code raise challenging prac-
tical issues for creditors and important constitutional issues for all.17
It is time for policymakers and courts to question this overlap be-
tween a federal bankruptcy scheme whose purpose is to reorganize
a debtor’s business assets and free those assets from creditors’
claims and state debtor-creditor laws. These state laws should focus
on the collection and liquidation of a debtor’s assets for the payment
of creditors’ claims.
The appropriate allocation of debtor and creditor rights and reme-
dies between federal and state statutory schemes requires a delicate
balancing of the interests at stake. There unquestionably is a
federal interest in, among other things, protecting both debtors and
creditors from discrimination, unfair or different standards for
satisfying debts, and any undue burdens in invoking the protections
afforded by federal bankruptcy laws.18 These concerns affect not
15. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 616 (1918).
16. Although this Article focuses on state receivership law, at least two states have
included assignment for the benefit of creditors within their revised receivership acts. In these
states, assignees generally have the same expanded rights and powers as receivers with
respect to the debtor’s assets. See MINN. STAT. § 577.18 (2016) (“Except as otherwise provided
in this chapter, an assignee shall be treated as a general receiver, the assignment property
shall be treated as receivership property, and all proceedings following the filing of the
assignment shall be governed by sections 576.21 to 576.53.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.08.030
(2017) (“By making this assignment, the assignor consents to the appointment of the assignee
as a general receiver with respect to the assignee’s property in accordance with chapter 7.60
RCW.”). Accordingly, this Article’s discussion of potential issues with expanded rights and
powers for state law receivers applies equally to state law assignees.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 1106-1107 (2d ed. 1851) (discussing the importance of the equal treatment of
creditors and fresh starts for debtors under the Bankruptcy Clause and also explaining that
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only interstate, but also international, trade, and business relations.
States have an interest in protecting their residents and providing
effective means for them to pay creditors when assets otherwise
prove insufficient.19 At some point, the interests of Congress and the
states collide. Such federalism concerns are not new or novel in the
bankruptcy context.
As explained more fully in Part I, the history of the federal bank-
ruptcy laws is replete with examples of tension between federal and
state concerns. Indeed, remnants of these struggles remain in the
Bankruptcy Code, as the Code references state law or allows for the
application of state law (as in the case of exemptions with respect to
individual debtors) in several places.20 The balance struck in the
Bankruptcy Code is not, however, determinative for federal preemp-
tion purposes.21 Moreover, the Supreme Court has not considered
the federal preemption issue as it relates to general state debtor-
creditor laws in any meaningful way for over eighty years.22 Federal
and state laws and the structure of business bankruptcy have
changed significantly during that time.23
Congress has a strong interest in “preserving harmony, promoting justice, and securing
equality of rights and remedies among the citizens of all the states. It is obvious, that if the
power is exclusively vested in the states, each one will be at liberty to frame such a system
of legislation upon the subject of bankruptcy and insolvency, as best suits its own local
interests and pursuits.”).
19. See id. § 1107 (“[D]iversities of almost infinite variety and object may be introduced
into the local system, which may work gross injustice and inequality, and nourish feuds and
discontents in neighboring states.”).
20. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2012) (stating that exempt property in an individual
bankruptcy case includes “any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than
subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing
of the petition”); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 24 (1995) (“The exemption question, so divisive under
the 1867 Act, was resolved in favor of allowing the debtor to claim only state exemptions. No
separate federal exemptions were permitted.”).
21. See infra Parts I.D, III.A.
22. The Supreme Court’s last opinion directly addressing the preemption of a state’s
assignment for the benefit of creditors or receivership law by federal bankruptcy law was
Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U.S. 518, 521 (1933). As discussed in Part I.D, the Court
has since considered other preemption issues relating to the Bankruptcy Act and the
Bankruptcy Code. See also, e.g., Marine Harbor Props., Inc. v. Mfrs. Tr. Co., 317 U.S. 78, 82-86
(1942) (considering whether the debtor filed its petition under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act in good faith given a pending state law receivership proceeding); Faitoute Iron & Steel Co.
v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 503 (1942) (analyzing a New Jersey statute governing
the adjustment of a municipality’s debt).
23. See infra Part I.B.
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This Article suggests rethinking the scope of the Bankruptcy
Clause and enforcing appropriate parameters for federal preemption
in the bankruptcy context. State law does and should provide reme-
dies for creditors against a defaulting party. Those remedies should
include the traditional tools of foreclosing against the collateral
securing the debt, obtaining a judgment lien to facilitate a foreclo-
sure, or seeking the assistance of a receiver or assignee to collect
and liquidate the debtor’s assets for the payment of debts.24 The
latter remedy should not, however, include the power to reorganize
the debtor’s business through a going-concern sale.25
As used in this Article, a going-concern “reorganization” sale
includes the orderly administration of a debtor’s business by, for
example, implementing an automatic stay, selling all or substan-
tially all of the debtor’s assets free from existing or successor
liabilities, transferring contracts and leases without counterparty
consent,26 and allowing the business to continue as an operating ent-
ity after the closing of the sale.27 A state law scheme that facilitates
a going-concern reorganization sale presents at least two issues.
First, it uses powers traditionally reserved to a bankruptcy trustee
or debtor in possession to facilitate a fresh start for a debtor’s
24. For a general discussion of creditors’ general state law remedies, see 1 WILLIAM H.
BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 7:75 (2017); and Edward J. Janger, The Logic
and Limits of Liens, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 595-605. For a general discussion of
receiverships and assignments for the benefit of creditors, see infra Parts II.B, III.B.
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. This Article references “counterparty consent” in the context of sales where parties
have negotiated contract terms that require the counterparty’s consent to certain transactions
or assignments of the contract, or that provide the counterparty with certain rights upon
events such as a change of control or insolvency. Not every contract may include these provi-
sions, but the phrase is intended to capture those that do.
27. State law receivers and assignees may be able to sell all or substantially all of a
company’s assets in the context of liquidating the company under state law. See infra Part
II.B. These sales also may be free of some liens, provided that proper notice is given and
procedures are followed. See infra Parts II.B, III.B. State laws have not, however, historically
granted receivers or assignees powers beyond those necessary to accomplish the liquidation
of the assets—in other words, powers reserved to bankruptcy trustees and debtors in
possession under the Bankruptcy Code. See infra Part III.B. Likewise, the package of
expanded rights and powers for receivers and assignees discussed in this Article exceed the
traditional powers of corporate directors to sell the company’s assets. Even in the context of
asset sales (as opposed to stock sales), corporations cannot override change of control, anti-
assignment, and similar contractual provisions, and the assets may remain subject to suc-
cessor liability in certain cases.
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business.28 Second, it may provide creditors with rights or distribu-
tions that are different from, and conflict with, the Bankruptcy
Code.29 Accordingly, such state law schemes raise both field and
conflict preemption issues under the Bankruptcy Clause,30 and also
may separately violate the Contract Clause.
Part I of this Article examines the origins of the Bankruptcy Code
and the Supreme Court’s historical approach to the Bankruptcy
Clause and federal preemption, and the Contract Clause, in the
bankruptcy context. This Part explains the nuances of federal pre-
emption law, specifically considering field and conflict preemption.31
It also reviews how state and lower federal courts have addressed
preemption under the Bankruptcy Code, given that Supreme Court
precedent exists primarily under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and
prior federal bankruptcy laws.32 Part II then considers the increas-
ing similarities between federal bankruptcy law and state debtor-
creditor laws and the potential implications of this trend. Part III
focuses on the content and scope of the Bankruptcy Code and states’
debtor-creditor laws to consider whether the two bodies of law can
coexist, or whether instead certain aspects of state laws are, or
should be, preempted by the Code. This Article concludes by re-
thinking the appropriate approach to federal preemption in bank-
ruptcy to promote the efficient and effective administration of
28. See, e.g., HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 13 (2d ed. 1915) (“The subject of ‘bankruptcies’ [within Congress’s power] includes
the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities as well as to distrib-
ute his property. The grant to Congress involves the power to impair the obligation of con-
tracts, and this the States were forbidden to do.”); see also infra Part II.
29. See infra Part III.A.2.
30. As explained in Part III.A, preemption under the Supremacy Clause generally falls
into the following three categories: express, implied field, and implied conflict preemption.
Express preemption occurs when Congress articulates the supremacy of the federal law in the
statute itself. See, e.g., Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601, 613-14 (6th Cir.
2012) (citing R.R. Ventures, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 299 F.3d 523, 561 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Field preemption is regulation that “is so pervasive or the federal interest is so dominant that
an intent can be inferred for federal law to occupy the field exclusively.” Id. at 614 (quoting
R.R. Ventures, Inc., 299 F.3d at 561). Finally, implied conflict preemption involves laws that
potentially conflict “such that it is impossible for a party to comply with both laws
simultaneously, or where the enforcement of the state law would hinder or frustrate the full
purposes and objectives of the federal law.” Id. (citing R.R. Ventures, Inc., 299 F.3d at 561).
31. See infra Part I.D.
32. See infra Part I.D.2.
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distressed businesses under the Bankruptcy Code.33 Business debt-
ors and their creditors need the certainty and protections of a
uniform federal bankruptcy law when a proposed resolution will
continue the business while impairing the rights of, and obligations
and distributions to, creditors and contract parties.34 That is the
essence of reorganization.
I. HISTORICAL BOUNDARIES: CONSTITUTIONAL AND PREEMPTION
ISSUES IN BANKRUPTCY
The U.S. Constitution strikes a delicate balance between federal
and state powers. That balance and the resulting potential tension
are evident in both the Bankruptcy Clause and the Contract Clause.
Although this Article focuses primarily on the Bankruptcy Clause,
the Contract Clause informs the analysis in several meaningful
ways. For example, most courts and commentators agree that Con-
gress is authorized to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, but they
also acknowledge some continuing role for state laws governing
debtor-creditor relationships. One notable difference between fed-
eral and state laws in this context, however, is the ability of Con-
gress to impair contractual relationships, which states for the most
part cannot do—at least retroactively and with respect to contracts
not subject to that state’s laws—under the Contract Clause.35
Indeed, this difference has helped courts define certain parameters
of preemption in the bankruptcy field, which tend to limit preemp-
tion to state laws affecting a discharge of a debtor’s obligations.36
This Article challenges such an artificial and static preemption
analysis. The materials in this Part provide the background neces-
sary to understand fully the justifications for a broader preemption
doctrine. Specifically, this Part analyzes prior and existing ap-
proaches to preemption in bankruptcy matters. Subsequent Parts
then discuss existing practices in business bankruptcies and sig-
nificant changes in state laws that warrant reconsideration of the
doctrine. They also identify key factors for policymakers and courts
33. See infra Parts III.C-D.
34. See infra Part III.C.
35. For discussions of the Contract Clause, see infra Parts I.C and III.A.3.
36. See infra Part I.D.2.
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to consider in evaluating the constitutionality of state laws in the
face of the Bankruptcy Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Bank-
ruptcy Code.37
A. The Origins of the Bankruptcy Clause
At the time of the Constitutional Convention, the states deter-
mined whether, and to what extent, bankruptcy laws would exist.
The Articles of Confederation did not address bankruptcy laws on
a federal level,38 and, as with other commerce matters, the states
retained exclusive control over bankruptcy.39 This independent ap-
proach to bankruptcy produced variances in state laws, with some
states following the British template for bankruptcy and insolvency
laws, and other states adopting a more progressive approach.40
Despite different approaches, state bankruptcy laws before the
Constitution’s adoption were generally characterized as pro-debtor,
favoring the states’ respective residents, and therefore disadvanta-
geous to out-of-state creditors.41 The potential for discrimination
37. See infra Part III.
38. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 319, 340 (2013) (“While some merchants apparently hoped for a national
bankruptcy law, the Articles of Confederation never provided one.”).
39. See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 4-5 (W.S. Hein 1994).
40. See id. at 6-7 (explaining that Pennsylvania embraced a system akin to the English
bankruptcy system, which was limited to insolvent merchants, but that Rhode Island, New
York, and other states took different approaches); Samuel Williston, The Effect of a National
Bankruptcy Law upon State Laws, 22 HARV. L. REV. 547, 548-49 (1909) (“But though many
states have on their statute books laws dealing with the subject of bankruptcy, it would be
hard to find two states whose laws are identical with one another, and no state has a law
identical with the national act.”).
41. As Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes explained in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v.
Blaisdell:
The widespread distress following the revolutionary period and the plight of
debtors, had called forth in the States an ignoble array of legislative schemes for
the defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual obligations. Legislative
interferences had been so numerous and extreme that the confidence essential
to prosperous trade had been undermined and the utter destruction of credit was
threatened. “The sober people of America” were convinced that some “thorough
reform” was needed which would “inspire a general prudence and industry, and
give a regular course to the business of society.”
290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison)); see also
WARREN, supra note 39, at 6-7; Tabb, supra note 20, at 12-13 (discussing the pro-debtor
nature of state law and noting, “A bankruptcy law was apparently believed to be a necessary
subject of federal legislation because of the problems that varying and discriminatory state
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against out-of-state parties and disruptions to interstate commerce
reportedly led the Framers to consider and adopt the Bankruptcy
Clause.42 Those in favor of a national economy voiced similar con-
cerns to support the adoption of the Contract Clause, which provides
that “[n]o State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.”43 As James Madison explained, the Contract Clause was
necessary to “banish speculations on public measures, inspire a gen-
eral prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the busi-
ness of society.”44 
The Framers adopted the Bankruptcy Clause with little debate or
fanfare.45 The Bankruptcy Clause was originally proposed as an
addition to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV.46 That
placement could suggest greater focus on the enforceability of state
laws rather than the need for, and uniformity of, a national bank-
ruptcy law.47 Most commentators, however, connect the Bankruptcy
Clause directly to the Commerce Clause. This position finds support
in the final placement of the Bankruptcy Clause in Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution and the language of the clause itself, which
laws caused for nonresident creditors and interstate commerce in general”); Williston, supra
note 40, at 549.
42. See, e.g., Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471-72 (1982) (discussing
the abusive practices in various states’ bankruptcy laws at the time of the Constitutional
Convention, examining the history of the Bankruptcy Clause (including its original discussion
in the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause) against this backdrop, and observing that
“[t]he Framers sought to provide Congress with the power to enact uniform laws on the
subject [of bankruptcies] enforceable among the States”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 278
(James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (observing the close relation between a uniform
national bankruptcy law and interstate commerce).
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see, e.g., In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 716, 718 (C.C.D. Mo.
1843) (No. 7,865) (discussing the Bankruptcy Clause, and observing, “The great object was to
deprive the states of the dangerous power to abolish debts. Few provisions in the constitution
have had more beneficial consequences than this, and the kindred inhibition on the states
that they should pass no law impairing the obligation of contracts.”).
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 42, at 288 (James Madison).
45. See, e.g., WARREN, supra note 39, at 4-5 (observing that the Bankruptcy Clause was
not offered until late in the convention and that “[o]n September 3, 1787, this clause was
adopted with practically no debate”).
46. See id.
47. Although, as explained herein, many commentators relate the Bankruptcy Clause di-
rectly to the Commerce Clause, a counter-narrative exists that posits the Bankruptcy Clause
was intended solely to ensure comity among the states with respect to state bankruptcy laws.
See Lubben, supra note 38, at 340-41 (explaining that the late Kurt Nadelmann and others
have argued that the Bankruptcy Clause is more closely tied to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause rather than the Commerce Clause).
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provides, “The Congress shall have Power To ... establish ... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.”48 The writings of James Madison and Justice Joseph Story
also adhere to this view.49 Indeed, Madison observed that
[t]he power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so
intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will
prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may
lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it
seems not likely to be drawn into question.50
Several early cases provoked questions concerning the scope of
the Bankruptcy Clause and whether it includes bankruptcy and
insolvency laws, laws governing distressed (but not insolvent)
debtors, and voluntary bankruptcies.51 English law at the time of
the Constitution drew a stark distinction between “bankruptcy”
laws that covered insolvent merchants and provided a discharge, in
certain instances, and “insolvency laws” that covered other kinds of
debtors and offered more limited forms of relief.52 Notably, neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has interpreted the Bankruptcy
Clause in such limiting ways.53 As the following Sections explain,
both Congress and the Supreme Court have repeatedly looked to
context and precedent when invoking and applying the Bankruptcy
Clause.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4.
49. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 42, at 124-25 (James Madison); id. NO.
42, at 278 (James Madison); STORY, supra note 18, §§ 1105, 1107-1110.
50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 42, at 278.
51. Traditional English bankruptcy was involuntary in nature, meaning that creditors
could charge a debtor with bankruptcy, but a debtor could not voluntarily seek bankruptcy
relief. See, e.g., Tabb, supra note 20, at 16-17 (examining the tension in the promulgation of
early federal bankruptcy laws and the assertion by some that voluntary bankruptcies were
unconstitutional); see also Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63
TENN. L. REV. 487, 527-38 (1996) (providing a thoughtful overview of, and historical per-
spective on, the Bankruptcy Clause); id. at 491-92 (positing that “[u]nder the Bankruptcy
Clause, Congress may only enact legislation that regulates the relationship between an
insolvent debtor and her creditors”).
52. See Tabb, supra note 20, at 12.
53. See infra Parts I.B-D.
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B. Early Bankruptcy Laws in the United States
Congress did not invoke the Bankruptcy Clause immediately or
with any permanency until 1898.54 Nevertheless, the early and
short-lived federal bankruptcy laws demonstrate an evolution in
bankruptcy legislation at both the federal and state levels. Congress
passed the early federal bankruptcy laws in response to financial
crises, and it repealed those laws because of dissatisfaction with the
schemes and the availability of state laws to fill the gaps.55 Congress
gradually recognized the inability of state laws to remedy financial
distress on a national scale.56 As the country grew, so did the im-
portance of an effective national bankruptcy scheme.57
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the first significant piece of
federal bankruptcy legislation to address the country’s financial
stability in a proactive manner.58 The 1898 Act authorized both vol-
untary and involuntary bankruptcies and permitted compositions
to facilitate the payment of debts over time.59 It did not require in-
solvency as a prerequisite to invocation of the statute, other than in
the involuntary context, and it used a “balance sheet” approach to
gauge solvency.60 The 1898 Act’s application to corporations was
refined in 1934 in response to the Great Depression.61 The business
provisions were changed once again in 1938 under the Chandler
Act.62 Both the 1934 and 1938 amendments were premised on a sim-
ilar “rescue and rehabilitate” principle.63
54. See, e.g., Tabb, supra note 20, at 13-14.
55. See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 24-25 (2001); Lubben, supra note 38, at 360-61, 373; Tabb, supra note 20, at 14, 16,
19. Prior to 1898, Congress enacted bankruptcy legislation in 1800, 1841, and 1867. See Tabb,
supra note 20, at 13.
56. See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 38, at 384; Tabb, supra note 20, at 23.
57. See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 38, at 383-84.
58. See Tabb, supra note 20, at 24-26. It should be noted that the 1867 Bankruptcy Act
also permitted voluntary bankruptcies and corporate filings, so it was closer to the 1898 Act
than perhaps the prior two pieces of bankruptcy legislation. See id. at 19.
59. See id. at 25-26.
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., id. at 28.
62. See id. at 29-30.
63. “One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to ‘relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.’” Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-
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The Chandler Act offered three options for distressed businesses:
Chapter X focused on larger public corporations; Chapter XI ad-
dressed smaller business plans of arrangement; and Chapter XII
facilitated real estate plans of arrangement.64 This structure gov-
erned business reorganizations for the next forty years, though time
and experience would expose inefficiencies.65 These and other devel-
opments led to a congressional study of federal bankruptcy laws,66
and the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, which continues
to govern federal bankruptcies.67
With respect to business bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code
essentially combined Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Chandler Act
and established a scheme to foster the rehabilitation of distressed
businesses.68 As discussed in Part II, chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code offers a distressed company several options for reorganizing its
business operations.69 The debtor can achieve this goal through a
plan or a going-concern reorganization sale, and in both instances,
the business receives the coveted bankruptcy “fresh start.”70 But
this statutory evolution is only part of the story. The Supreme
Court’s approach to the Bankruptcy Clause is the other important
55 (1915)); see Jason J. Kilborn, Bankruptcy, in 1 GOVERNING AMERICA: MAJOR DECISIONS OF
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM 1789 TO THE PRESENT 42-43 (Paul J. Quirk
& William Cunion eds., 2011) (“With the rise of private business corporations in the mid- to
late 1800s, the rescue- and rehabilitation-oriented bankruptcy policy was extended to take
into account the ‘big business’ entities.”); see also David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III,
An Historical Analysis of Insolvency Laws and Their Impact on the Role, Power, and Juris-
diction of Today’s United States Bankruptcy Court and Its Judicial Officers, 9 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 165, 176 (2000) (“The Chandler Act was the Congressional response to the depression
and was modeled after the emergency legislation of the early 1930’s. Since 1938, there has
existed in America a Congressional policy favoring reorganization over liquidation, where
possible.”).
64. See Tabb, supra note 20, at 29-30. For a detailed history and analysis of the Chandler
Act, see generally Vincent L. Leibell, Jr., Comment, The Chandler Act—Its Effect upon the
Law of Bankruptcy, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 380 (1940).
65. See Tabb, supra note 20, at 30-32.
66. S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 84 Stat. 468 (1970). For further discussion about the
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws and its composition, see Report of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 29 BUS. LAW., 75, 75-76 (1973); and Kenneth N. Klee,
Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 942-43 (1979).
67. President Carter signed the Bankruptcy Code into law in November 1978. See Tabb,
supra note 20, at 34.
68. See id. at 35.
69. See infra Part II.A.
70. See infra Part II.A.
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piece of this Article’s analysis.71 Both components are necessary to
understand the appropriate parameters of federal preemption in the
current legal and economic environment. The Supreme Court’s key
decisions are discussed below.72
C. The Supreme Court’s Approach to the Bankruptcy Clause
One of the earliest cases to address the scope of the Bankruptcy
Clause was Sturges v. Crowninshield.73 This case involved a New
York law that both released the debtor from prison and granted a
discharge upon the relinquishment of the debtor’s assets for the pay-
ment of creditors’ claims.74 The case arose during a time in which no
federal bankruptcy law was in force.75 Consequently, the Court’s
decision, authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, speaks primarily
to the powers retained by the states in light of both the Bankruptcy
Clause and the Contract Clause.76
As a general matter, Chief Justice Marshall explained, 
[S]ince the adoption of the constitution of the United States, a
State has authority to pass a bankrupt law, provided such law
does not impair the obligation of contracts, within the meaning
of the constitution, and provided there be no act of Congress in
force to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy, conflicting
with such law.77
Chief Justice Marshall provided a thoughtful review of the kinds of
insolvency and bankruptcy laws in effect at the time, and noted the
difficulty in drawing such distinctions.78 He then determined that
the states retained the authority to enact such laws, regardless of
the labels used to characterize them, provided that the laws were
consistent with the Constitution—in other words, they did not vio-
71. See infra Part I.C.
72. See infra Part I.C. See generally KENNETH N. KLEE & WHITMAN L. HOLT, BANKRUPTCY
AND THE SUPREME COURT: 1801-2014 (2015) (providing a detailed examination of the Supreme
Court’s bankruptcy cases).
73. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 192 (1819).
74. Id. at 191.
75. See Tabb, supra note 20, at 15.
76. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 192-93, 196-97.
77. Id. at 208.
78. Id. at 194-95.
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late either the Bankruptcy Clause or the Contract Clause.79 Because
no federal bankruptcy law was in force, the Contract Clause was the
key issue in the case.80
Chief Justice Marshall described a contract as “an agreement in
which a party undertakes to do, or not to do, a particular thing.”81
The Framers arguably intended the Contract Clause to cover debt
instruments like the promissory notes at issue in Sturges, but Chief
Justice Marshall’s description illustrated the breadth of the Clause
as reaching most kinds of contracts.82 He further explained, “The
law binds him to perform his undertaking, and this is, of course, the
obligation of his contract.... Any law which releases a part of this
obligation, must, in the literal sense of the word, impair it.”83 The
Court then struck down the New York law as impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts.84
The Court’s next major decision on state bankruptcy laws, Ogden
v. Saunders, again involved a New York debtor-creditor law that
granted the debtor a discharge of her debts upon the consent of at
least two-thirds of her creditors.85 The Court, this time with Chief
Justice Marshall dissenting,86 restated several of the key themes
from the Sturges opinion, but clarified that its holding in Sturges
applied primarily with respect to contracts in existence at the time
of the enactment of the state bankruptcy law and subject to the laws
of that state.87 Contracts entered into after such time necessarily in-
corporated the limitations of the new law, according to the majority
in Ogden.88 Thus, under the Court’s reasoning, a state bankruptcy
79. Id. at 196-97.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 197.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 208.
85. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 215 (1827).
86. Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Gabriel Duvall, and Justice Story dissented, primarily
on the ground that the Contract Clause should apply to all state laws impairing the obligation
of contract, whether such law applied retroactively or prospectively. Id. at 354 (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting) (“That the words of the clause in the constitution which we are considering, taken
in their natural and obvious sense, admit of a prospective, as well as of a retrospective, opera-
tion.”).
87. See id. at 273 (Johnson, J.).
88. Id. at 301-04 (Thompson, J.). For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s later precedent
on the Contract Clause, see infra notes 321-28 and accompanying text.
2017] RETHINKING PARAMETERS IN BANKRUPTCY 165
law that applied only prospectively likely could withstand a chal-
lenge brought under the Contract Clause.89
1. Cases Under Early Federal Bankruptcy Laws
Following Ogden, lower courts had the opportunity to consider the
constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Acts of 1841 and 1867. In these
decisions, relying on the Court’s description of the Bankruptcy
Clause in Sturges and Ogden, courts determined that Congress
could enact both bankruptcy and insolvency laws,90 that such laws
could apply to debtors other than merchants (including corpora-
tions),91 and that they could facilitate a composition of creditors.92
These cases demonstrate the potential breadth of the Bankruptcy
Clause and suggest that the term “bankruptcies” means something
more than a law granting a discharge to debtors.93
The Supreme Court also had occasion to evaluate certain state
laws in light of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. In Boese v. King and
Mayer v. Hellman, the Court upheld state laws facilitating or per-
mitting the assignment of a debtor’s assets for the payment of credi-
tors’ claims.94 Both cases recognized that state laws conflicting with
the federal law, including the discharge provision of the New Jersey
statute at issue in Boese, were suspended so long as the federal law
remained in force.95 They also, however, upheld the assignments in
89. See Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 301-04.
90. See In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 716, 718-19 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 7,865) (upholding the
1841 Act and noting, “In considering the question before me, I have not pretended to give a
definition, but purposely avoided any attempt to define the mere word ‘bankruptcy.’ It is
employed in the constitution in the plural and as part of an expression—‘the subject of
bankruptcies.’ The ideas attached to the word in this connection are numerous and compli-
cated.”).
91. See In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490, 494-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 11,673) (citing In re
Silverman, 22 F. Cas. 135 (D. Or. 1870) (No. 12,855)).
92. See id. at 497 (“In view of all these considerations, how can it be said that these provi-
sions for composition do not relate to the ‘subject of bankruptcies?’ They relate to the subject
of debts owing by a debtor to creditors, and to the relation of the debtor to his creditors, in
view of his assets and of such debts.”).
93. See id. at 496 (“What is ‘the subject of bankruptcies?’ It is not, properly, anything less
than the subject of the relations between an insolvent or non-paying or fraudulent debtor, and
his creditors, extending to his and their relief.”).
94. Boese v. King, 108 U.S. 379, 387 (1883); Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1875).
95. Boese, 108 U.S. at 385-86; Mayer, 91 U.S. at 502-03.
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each case, finding no conflict between those state law provisions not
granting a discharge and the federal bankruptcy law.96
Notably, the assignments at issue in Boese and Mayer were akin
to traditional assignments for the benefit of creditors that were well
recognized under states’ common and statutory laws.97 These
schemes generally permitted the debtor to transfer her property to
an assignee or trustee, who would then distribute such property pro
rata among the debtor’s creditors.98 Such assignments generally
were voluntary, were subject to bankruptcy cases commenced within
six months of the assignment under the 1867 Act, and did not
provide a discharge of any kind.99 These basic attributes of tradi-
tional assignments are central to the Court’s decisions upholding
state debtor-creditor laws during this period.100
2. Cases Under the 1898 and 1978 Federal Bankruptcy Laws
The Court’s next significant opinion considered the scope of the
Bankruptcy Clause and its impact on state laws related to the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and the Court continued the trend of
upholding state debtor-creditor laws akin to assignments. Specifi-
cally, in Stellwagen v. Clum, the Court analyzed two aspects of
Ohio’s receivership law.101 One aspect of the law continued Ohio’s
practice of allowing creditors to challenge and avoid fraudulent
transfers.102 The other aspect of the law, which was new at the time,
authorized the appointment of a receiver to take charge of, and
distribute, the debtor’s assets and pursue creditors’ fraudulent
transfer claims.103 The Court considered whether the state law
impeded creditors’ rights or otherwise conflicted with the policies of
the Bankruptcy Code.104 Answering those questions in the negative,
the Court observed, “It is only state laws which conflict with the
96. Boese, 108 U.S. at 387; Mayer, 91 U.S. at 502-03.
97. Boese, 108 U.S. at 385-86; Mayer, 91 U.S. at 502-03.
98. See, e.g., Boese, 108 U.S. at 384; Mayer, 91 U.S. at 500.
99. See, e.g., Mayer, 91 U.S. at 500-01.
100. See, e.g., Boese, 108 U.S. at 385-87; Mayer, 91 U.S. at 502-03.
101. 245 U.S. 605, 609 & n.1 (1918).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 611-12.
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bankruptcy laws of Congress that are suspended; those which are
in aid of the Bankruptcy Act can stand.”105
Not long after Stellwagen, the Court had an opportunity to con-
sider a fact pattern that directly tested the Court’s correlation
between bankruptcy and discharge. In International Shoe Co. v.
Pinkus, the Court reviewed an Arkansas law, similar to the New
Jersey statute at issue in Boese, which permitted the assignment of
a debtor’s assets and conditioned distributions to creditors upon
their consent to a discharge of the debtor.106 The Court started from
the basic premise that “[a] State is without power to make or en-
force any law governing bankruptcies that impairs the obligation of
contracts or extends to persons or property outside its jurisdiction
or conflicts with the national bankruptcy laws.”107 It then scruti-
nized the Arkansas law at issue, noting that it was more than a
mere assignment for the benefit of creditors in that “the property
was not handed over simply for the purpose of the payment of debts
as far as it would go.”108
The Court found the discharge aspect of the Arkansas law fatal,
rendering the state law unconstitutional in light of the federal
Bankruptcy Act.109 Although the holding focused on discharge, the
Court’s description of the field occupied by the federal Bankruptcy
Act was much broader.110 For example, the Court observed,
It is clear that the provisions of the Arkansas law governing the
distribution of property of insolvents for the payment of their
debts and providing for their discharge, or that otherwise relate
to the subject of bankruptcies, are within the field entered by
Congress when it passed the Bankruptcy Act, and therefore such
provisions must be held to have been superseded.111
105. Id. at 615.
106. 278 U.S. 261, 266 (1929).
107. Id. at 263-64.
108. Id. at 266.
109. Id. at 268.
110. Id. at 265-66.
111. Id. at 266.
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Subsequent opinions have noted the potential breadth of this
language, but have generally required the discharge concept to sup-
port preemption.112
For example, in Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., the Court upheld
a Wisconsin law that facilitated an assignment for the benefit of
creditors that was severable from the discharge provisions in the
state law.113 In Pobreslo, the Court quoted the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s explanation of the Wisconsin law,
In the matter of Voluntary Assignment of Tarnowski ... it was
held that the right to make a voluntary assignment for the bene-
fit of creditors is a personal right inherent in the ownership of
property, and existed at common law independent of the statute;
that, while the discharge of a bankrupt from his debts consti-
tutes the very essence of the Bankruptcy Law, the discharge of
a debtor is no part of an assignment law.114
The Court also distinguished International Shoe as involving a state
law that “not only governed discharge of the bankrupt debtor but
imposed conditions which trammeled and made against equal
distribution of his property.”115 Consequently, state laws that allow
debtors to assign their assets to a third party (for example, assignee,
trustee, or receiver) for pro rata distribution to their creditors
112. Indeed, even in decisions prior to International Shoe, the Court focused on discharge,
but would not rule out a broader application of field preemption under the Bankruptcy Clause.
For example, in Stellwagen, the Court explained,
And while it is not necessary to decide that there may not be state insolvent
laws which are suspended although not providing for a discharge of indebt-
edness, all the cases lay stress upon the fact that one of the principal requisites
of a true bankruptcy law is for the benefit of the debtor in that it discharges his
future acquired property from the obligation of existing debts.
245 U.S. 605, 616 (1918). For an interesting discussion of whether a “discharge” provision is
necessary to invalidate state law governing debtor-creditor relations, see Moskowitz v.
Prentice (In re Wis. Builders Supply Co.), 239 F.2d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 1956) (opining that a
discharge provision is not necessary to suspend a state law preempted by a national bank-
ruptcy act and collecting lower court decisions on the issue).
113. 287 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1933).
114. Id. at 524 (omission in original) (quoting Hazelwood v. Olinger Bldg., Dep’t Stores Inc.,
236 N.W. 591, 592 (Wis. 1931)).
115. Id. at 525; see also Johnson v. Star, 287 U.S. 527, 530 (1933) (relying on Pobreslo in
context of analyzing a Texas statute). But see Int’l Shoe Co., 278 U.S. at 266 (suggesting that
preemption extends beyond the concept of discharge); In re Wis. Builders, 239 F.2d at 652
(same).
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generally are permissible and have withstood Supreme Court
scrutiny. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
explained:
[Supreme Court precedent on the Bankruptcy Clause] implies a
recognition of possible alternatives to bankruptcy and that the
creditors have a choice of administration, i.e., either the assignee
or receiver selected by the debtor or one selected and supervised
under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. The question is not
whether states may legislate at all, but rather how far may they
go.116
During this period, the Court also considered the permissible
breadth of federal laws enacted under the Bankruptcy Clause. As
discussed above, the 1898 Act included reorganization provisions for
railroads and other business entities.117 It also allowed debt-
ors—whether truly insolvent—to invoke these reorganization laws
and the provisions of the Act generally.118 The Court in these and
other instances upheld the constitutionality of the 1898 Act.119 As
the Court explained in Wright v. Union Central Life Insurance Co.:
The right of the Congress to legislate on the subject of bankrupt-
cies is granted by the Constitution in general terms.... The
subject of bankruptcies is incapable of final definition. The con-
cept changes. It has been recognized that it is not limited to the
connotation of the phrase in England or the States, at the time
of the formulation of the Constitution. An adjudication in
bankruptcy is not essential to the jurisdiction. The subject of
bankruptcies is nothing less than “the subject of the relations
between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his
creditors, extending to his and their relief.”120
116. In re Wis. Builders, 239 F.2d at 653-54 (striking down the involuntary proceeding
provisions of the Wisconsin statute, finding that “[t]here is no doubt that Section 128.06 is
suspended because it is in conflict with the subject matter covered by the federal law”;
notably, the court did not invalidate the entire statute).
117. See supra Part I.C.1.
118. See supra Part I.C.1.
119. See, e.g., Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 516 (1938); Kuehner v.
Irving Tr. Co., 299 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1937); Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island
& Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 675, 680 (1935).
120. Wright, 304 U.S. at 513-14 (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490,
496 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 11,673)).
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Court has not addressed many similar issues in the context of the
1978 Bankruptcy Code.121 Much of the Court’s jurisprudence on the
Bankruptcy Code has related to jurisdictional issues or strict stat-
utory interpretation and application issues.122 As a result, the lower
federal courts and state courts have attempted to engraft the
Court’s older precedent on newer issues arising under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.123 The following Section summarizes this case law.
D. The Preemption Doctrine, Bankruptcy, and State Debtor-
Creditor Laws
State debtor-creditor laws and federal bankruptcy laws have co-
existed in one form or another since Congress enacted the first
Bankruptcy Act in 1800.124 Nevertheless, both federal bankruptcy
and state debtor-creditor laws have evolved since the Court’s last
opinions addressing their coexistence in the 1930s.125 This changing
landscape has created new potential preemption issues, particularly
in the context of field and conflict preemption, doctrines under
which preemption is implied rather than set out in the language of
a federal statute.126
In bankruptcy, as in other disciplines, field preemption speaks to
federal law that is sufficiently comprehensive “to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for” supplementary state
regulation.127 Conflict preemption, on the other hand, applies “when
‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical im-
possibility,’ or when state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’”128 The following Sections first discuss recent Supreme
121. See infra Part I.D.
122. See infra Part I.D.
123. See infra Part I.D.
124. See infra Part II.
125. See, e.g., Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U.S. 518 (1933); see also infra Part II.
126. See infra Part III.A.
127. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The Court also has ex-
plained that field preemption applies where “the federal interest is so dominant that the fed-
eral system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Id.
128. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (citations omit-
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Court precedent on the preemption doctrine involving disciplines
other than bankruptcy and then turn to lower courts’ application of
the preemption doctrine in the bankruptcy context.
1. The Supreme Court and the Preemption Doctrine
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the federal preemption
doctrine is extensive, not always consistent,129 and the subject of
much commentary.130 This Section focuses on the Court’s discussions
of implied preemption—specifically, field and conflict preemp-
tion—given the limited nature of any statutory preemption lan-
guage in the Bankruptcy Code. That said, the Bankruptcy Clause
itself authorizes Congress to occupy the field of bankruptcy, which
should inform any analysis of congressional intent as to the scope,
purposes, and objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.131
The Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States is a good example
of the often-overlapping inquiry of implied field and conflict
preemption.132 The case involved certain laws passed by Arizona in
an attempt to unilaterally address the issue of illegal immigra-
ted) (first quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); and
then quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
129. The Court’s case-by-case analysis of preemption questions often leads to different
approaches and results in preemption cases. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, The FDA,
Preemption, and Public Safety, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 2011, at 11, 11 (criticizing
Court’s preemption jurispurdence as “maddeningly inconsistent”); Alan Untereiner, The
Defense of Preemption: A View from the Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1257, 1257 (2010) (finding
that federal preemption “law is a muddle”). That said, the Court’s preemption precedent
covers a wide array of industries, statutes, and considerations that may not readily lend itself
to a cohesive approach. See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presump-
tion Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 255 (positing that
preemption cases “reflect, instead, the fact that any overarching framework of preemption
principles must be applied to interpret a range of quite diverse statutory regimes, including
many in which courts must share interpretive duties with federal agencies”).
130.  See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws,
66 U. PITT. L. REV. 181, 181-86 (2004); Stephen Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the
States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 39-40 (2005); Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112
MICH. L. REV. 1, 2-8 (2013); Young, supra note 129, at 270-307.
131. See P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 503 (1988)
(“There is no federal pre-emption in vacuo, without a constitutional text or a federal statute
to assert it.”).
132. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500-02 (2012); see also id. at 2519-20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (discussing overlap of field and conflict preemption analysis).
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tion.133 The Court considered four provisions of the Arizona statute,
finding three of the provisions preempted and one constitutional.134
Similar to the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress’s authority to enact
federal immigration legislation also stems, in part, from Article I,
Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that Congress
has the power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”135
Also akin to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause, the Naturaliza-
tion Clause was meant to protect commerce. As the Court in Arizona
explained, “The federal power to determine immigration policy is
well settled. Immigration policy can affect trade, investment, tour-
ism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation.”136
One of the provisions at issue in Arizona involved additional
penalties imposed by the state for violations of the federal law.137
The Court considered the federal statutory scheme for the registra-
tion of aliens, and it determined that the scheme was comprehen-
sive and addressed all aspects of alien registration, including the
consequences of noncompliance.138 According to the Court, the
scheme “was designed as a ‘harmonious whole.’”139 The Court ob-
served, “Where Congress occupies an entire field, as it has in the
field of alien registration, even complementary state regulation is
impermissible.”140 In doing so, the Court rejected the State’s argu-
ment that its penalty provisions were simply in aid of the federal
law.141
The two other provisions of the Arizona statute struck down in
the case attempted to criminalize conduct that was not addressed by
133. See id. at 2497-98.
134. See id. at 2510.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
136. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.
137. Id. at 2501-02.
138. Id. at 2502.
139. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72 (1941)).
140. Id. The Court has carefully scrutinized field preemption claims, trying to balance the
federal and state issues at play. See, e.g., Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599-
1600 (2015) (taking a slightly narrower approach to field preemption and holding that only
state laws “aimed directly at” matters pertaining to wholesale sales and transportation in the
natural gas space were preempted) (quoting N. Nat. Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S.
84, 94 (1963)); Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 630-38 (2012) (upholding a
broadly defined field of preemption in the locomotive space despite amendments to the federal
statute at issue).
141. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.
2017] RETHINKING PARAMETERS IN BANKRUPTCY 173
the federal statute and to supplement the authority of state police
officers with respect to the removability of aliens under the federal
statute, respectively.142 In both instances, the Court held that the
state law created “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”143 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court analyzed and relied on the “text, structure,
and history” of the federal legislation.144
Not all of the members of the Supreme Court support a broad
implied preemption doctrine. For example, in his dissent in Ari-
zona145 and his concurrence in Wyeth v. Levine,146 Justice Clarence
Thomas posited that preemption analysis should be based solely on
the language of the applicable statutes. He explained that it “should
not be ‘[a] freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute
is in tension with federal objectives, but an inquiry into whether the
ordinary meanings of state and federal law conflict.’”147 Neverthe-
less, the Court has continued to invoke the field preemption doctrine
and a somewhat expansive consideration of the purposes and
objectives of the federal statute at issue.148 Notably, however, the
Court’s willingness to engage in a purposive analysis does not
always result in federal preemption of the state law at issue.149
The Court’s preemption analysis—whether or not solely text-
ual—is guided by two long-standing preemption principles. “First,
‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every
preemption case.’”150 The Court frequently analyzes the history and
142. See id. at 2505.
143. Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67); see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 883-86 (2000) (holding that the state law at issue was preempted because it conflicted
with Congress’s and the Department of Transportation’s purpose in enacting federal
regulation).
144. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505.
145. See id. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. 555 U.S. 555, 588 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
147. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 459
(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
148. See Meltzer, supra note 130, at 10-14.
149. See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 336 (2011) (consid-
ering Congress’s and the Department of Transportation’s purpose underlying the regulation
at issue and determining that the regulation did not preempt a state tort action on the same
subject matter).
150. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
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context of the federal legislation at issue in making this determina-
tion.151
Second, “[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in
which Congress has ‘legislated ... in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied,’ ... we ‘start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.’”152
At least one court of appeals has suggested that such a presumption
is weaker in cases involving the Bankruptcy Clause and the regu-
lation of creditors’ rights, which “has ‘a history of significant federal
presence.’”153
Despite its rich preemption precedent, the Supreme Court has not
directly confronted preemption issues with respect to state debtor-
creditor laws and business bankruptcies under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. In fact, the only recent Supreme Court case
discussing preemption, general debtor-creditor laws, and the Bank-
ruptcy Code in any meaningful way is Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cali-
fornia Tax-Free Trust.154 In that case, creditors argued that chapter
151. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
152. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Medtronic,
Inc., 518 U.S. at 485). Many commentators have explored the extent of the presumption
against preemption, with most acknowledging its continued role in Supreme Court decisions.
See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, The “New” Presumption Against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1217,
1229 (2010) (concluding that the Court continues to apply the presumption, but with greater
frequency in express preemption cases); Young, supra note 129, at 277-78.
153. In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 98, 111 (2d Cir. 2016)
(quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 90 (2000)), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-317
(U.S. Sept. 9, 2016). The Second Circuit also explained that, because “Congress’s power to
enact bankruptcy laws was made explicit in the Constitution as originally enacted ... and
detailed, preemptive federal regulation of creditors’ rights has, therefore, existed for over two
centuries.” Id. at 111 (citations omitted); see also Locke, 529 U.S. at 108 (explaining that the
presumption against preemption “is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where
there has been a history of significant federal presence,” such as in the field of international
shipping) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
154. 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1944 (2016). The Court has, however, discussed the scope of the Bank-
ruptcy Clause more generally. For example, in 2006, the Court examined the scope of the
Bankruptcy Clause in the context of a state’s claim to sovereign immunity. See Cent. Va.
Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373 (2006). In addition, the Court has addressed limited
preemption concepts and particular provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., BFP v. Reso-
lution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 533 (1994) (section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code); Midlantic
Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 496 (1986) (section 554 of the Bank-
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9 of the Bankruptcy Code (relating to municipal bankruptcies)
preempted a restructuring law passed by Puerto Rico in 2014 in
response to the island’s financial crisis.155 Although the parties
raised implied preemption issues, the Court decided the case based
solely on express preemption and the language of section 903 of the
Bankruptcy Code.156 Lower courts thus are left to transfer principles
from the Court’s very old Bankruptcy Act preemption cases and its
general preemption jurisprudence to often complicated cases under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code that raise nuanced issues not
previously considered by the Court.
2. Lower Courts’ Application of the Preemption Doctrine in the
Bankruptcy Context
Many courts confronted with a bankruptcy preemption issue
under the Bankruptcy Code have upheld the particular state debtor-
creditor law at issue.157 In fact, only one appellate court has
ruptcy Code).
155. See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. at 1942-43. Puerto Rico enacted the 2014
Public Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act to help it address approximately $20
billion of its much larger overall debt obligations. See id. Puerto Rico’s bondholders challenged
the legislation, and the Supreme Court ultimately held that the Bankruptcy Code preempted
the law. See id. at 1943-44.
156. See id. at 1946. Under section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, a municipality may only
be a debtor under chapter 9 if authorized by the state. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012). Section
101(52) includes Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia in the definition of “State” as used
in the Bankruptcy Code, “except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under
chapter 9.” Id. § 101(52). The language of section 903, in turn, addresses what a state may do
with respect to its municipalities given Congress’s decision to enact chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code. See id. § 903. The section specifically allows a state to continue to exercise
control over its municipalities, including the municipalities’ financial affairs, other than the
following: “[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of such
municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition; and ... a
judgment entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does not consent to such
composition.” Id. The Court determined that section 903 applied to Puerto Rico and
preempted its 2014 Recovery Act. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. at 1947.
157. See, e.g., Ready Fixtures Co. v. Steven Cabinets, 488 F. Supp. 2d 787, 792 (W.D. Wis.
2007); In re Newport Offshore Ltd., 219 B.R. 341, 355 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998); Cambio v. G-7
Corp., No. 96-0705, 1998 WL 1472896, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 1998). In addition,
several courts have considered the validity of state laws that are bankruptcy-specific, such
as state law exemptions that are only applicable if the debtor has filed a bankruptcy case. See,
e.g., Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601, 614-16 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding
Michigan bankruptcy-specific exemptions as being contemplated by an opt-out provision in
section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code and consistent with the fresh start objectives of the
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preempted such a law since the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code.158 This trend is perhaps understandable given the Supreme
Court precedent discussed above159 and the general presumption in
favor of state laws when challenged on federal preemption
grounds.160 Nevertheless, even a cursory review of these cases illus-
trates the need to rethink the relevance of a bankruptcy discharge
to preemption, as well as the import of the Bankruptcy Clause’s
reference to “subject of Bankruptcies.”161
Bankruptcy Code). These cases generally invoke federal preemption analysis. See, e.g., id. at
614. Moreover, in 1994, the Supreme Court addressed the interplay of state foreclosure law
and the Bankruptcy Code, holding that the price received through a properly conducted state
foreclosure proceeding was reasonably equivalent value for purposes of section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code. See Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. at 545.
158. See Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005).
Outside of state debtor-creditor laws, some lower courts have preempted various provisions
of state law. See, e.g., In re Tribune, 818 F.3d at 123 (holding that creditors’ state law fraud-
ulent conveyance claims were barred by section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code); Miles v. Okun
(In re Miles), 430 F.3d 1083, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the doctrine of complete
preemption barred the state law damages claim in light of section 303(i) of the Bankruptcy
Code and relying on the Supreme Court’s decision finding preemption under the National
Banking Act in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003)); In re Bratt, 527 B.R.
303, 305 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2015) (holding that the state law that set the interest rate on tax
claims was preempted as being in conflict with, and frustrating the purposes of, the Bank-
ruptcy Code), aff’d on other grounds, 549 B.R. 462 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. In re
Corrin, 849 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2017); In re Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 494 B.R. 466, 477 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2013) (finding state law governing automobile dealerships preempted by section 365
of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Old Carco, LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 212 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(same result as In re American Suzuki Motor Corp.). But see Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables
XVII, LLC, 835 F.3d 414, 421 (3d Cir. 2016) (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Miles); PAH Litig. Tr. v. Water St. Healthcare Partners L.P. (In re Physiotherapy Holdings,
Inc.), No. 13-12965(KG), 2016 WL 3611831, at *7 (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2016) (disagreeing
with Second Circuit’s preemption holding in Tribune). The Third Circuit in Rosenberg dis-
tinguished the Miles decision because, in that case, the Ninth Circuit relied on “complete pre-
emption,” which is different from the doctrine of field (or ordinary) preemption. Rosenberg,
835 F.3d at 421 n.4 (explaining the two doctrines). The Third Circuit explained complete
preemption as preemption that “operates to confer original federal subject matter jurisdiction
notwithstanding the absence of a federal cause of action on the face of the complaint.” Id.
(quoting In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999)).
159. See supra Parts I.C-D.1.
160. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“So we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” (first citing Napier
v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co, 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926); and then citing Allen-Bradley Local v.
Wis. Emp’t Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942))).
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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A good example of preemption analysis concerning state receiver-
ship laws and the Bankruptcy Code is the case of In re Newport
Offshore Ltd.162 In Newport Offshore, the debtor was placed into
state law receivership after emerging from an earlier chapter 11
bankruptcy case.163 The state law at issue authorized the appoint-
ment of receivers in an action by a creditor upon a showing of the
company’s insolvency or potential waste of assets.164 The receivers
were then empowered to liquidate the assets of the company, in-
cluding through an asset sale free of interests.165 The law did not
grant the debtor a discharge, but creditor collections outside of the
receivership were highly unlikely because the debtor—an entity in
this case—had no remaining assets.166
The court in Newport Offshore started with the premise that
Rhode Island had historically offered state law receiverships to its
residents.167 It then considered whether Congress had evidenced
intent to preempt this kind of receivership law through the adoption
of the Bankruptcy Code and the exercise of its powers under the
Bankruptcy Clause.168 The court determined that no such intent
existed, pointing to the Supreme Court’s holding in Pobreslo and the
absence of any discharge provision in the Rhode Island law.169 In so
holding, the court observed, “Receivership or similar liquidation
processes, available against (or invoked by) insolvent debtors are
plainly preempted if they refuse to yield to, or interfere with, federal
bankruptcy proceedings, but if they may be administered in har-
mony with the federal bankruptcy laws, they are not.”170
Courts also have considered the constitutionality of state laws
tangentially related to receiverships or assignments for the benefit
162. 219 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998). Notably, the receivership statute at issue in New-
port Offshore was repealed, but the case is still an accurate representation of how some courts
approach the issues. See 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-1.1-90 to -98 (1958), repealed by 2004 R.I. Pub.
Laws 819.
163. 219 B.R. at 342-43.
164. See id. at 347.
165. See id. at 348; see also John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Dykeman Elec. Co., 266 F.
Supp. 2d 208, 219 (D. Mass. 2003) (discussing the breadth of Rhode Island receivership law
based on Newport Offshore).
166. See In re Newport Offshore, 219 B.R. at 343.
167. See id. at 346-47.
168. See id. at 349.
169. See id. at 355.
170. Id. at 353-54 (citations omitted).
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of creditors (ABC), such as laws allowing an assignee or receiver to
pursue fraudulent transfer or preference claims against the debtor’s
transferees. Some courts have found that these laws align with the
powers historically exercised by the states and are consistent with
the Bankruptcy Code. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit disagreed, however, with respect to California’s preference
statute that applied in the context of ABCs.171
In Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., the Ninth Circuit struck
down California’s preference statute, finding that “[t]he exercise of
the preference avoidance power by Sherwood under the authority of
[the preference statute] is inconsistent with the enactment and
operation of the federal bankruptcy system and is therefore pre-
empted.”172 The Ninth Circuit recognized the Supreme Court’s
precedent in favor of voluntary assignments for the benefit of cred-
itors.173 It was concerned, however, by the scope of California’s
preference statute, which according to the Ninth Circuit created a
new right in the assignee that would not have been available to in-
dividual creditors.174 This new right had the potential, in the court’s
view, to conflict directly with the rights and remedies available to
creditors under the Bankruptcy Code.175 It also could discriminate
against out-of-state creditors who might benefit from a bankruptcy
case.176 The Ninth Circuit concluded, “We believe that statutes that
give state assignees or trustees avoidance powers beyond those that
may be exercised by individual creditors trench too close upon the
exercise of the federal bankruptcy power.”177
Both the dissent in Sherwood Partners and subsequent decisions
outside of the Ninth Circuit have criticized the Sherwood Partners
holding.178 The primary criticism suggests that the California law is
171. Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005).
172. Id.
173. See id. at 1205.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 1204.
177. Id. at 1205.
178. See id. at 1206-08 (Nelson, J., dissenting); see also Ready Fixtures Co. v. Stevens Cab-
inets, 488 F. Supp. 2d 787, 790-92 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (declining to follow Sherwood Partners
and upholding Wisconsin’s preference statute); Spector v. Melee Entm’t LLC, C.A. No. 07C-03-
191 PLA, 2008 WL 362125, *4-5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2008) (discussing how some California
state courts declined to follow Sherwood Partners and finding the Sherwood Partners dissent
more persuasive).
2017] RETHINKING PARAMETERS IN BANKRUPTCY 179
no different than other aspects of voluntary assignment laws that
have been upheld by courts, including the Supreme Court.179 As the
dissent explained, “[I]t is well established that there is a common-
law right to make an assignment ... for the benefit of creditors. It is
thus illogical that state laws that provide a forum for the equitable
distribution of that property should be preempted by federal bank-
ruptcy law.”180
As a general proposition, the dissent’s position in Sherwood Part-
ners has some appeal, in that it appears consistent with the
Supreme Court’s precedent on preemption in the bankruptcy con-
text.181 But the devil may be in the details. For example, does it
suggest that any state law enacted as part of the state’s receivership
or ABC law is valid so long as it does not grant the debtor a dis-
charge? Although such a law may garner a presumption of validity,
the remainder of this Article suggests a more robust and in-depth
analysis of state laws purporting to facilitate and govern the
collection and distribution of the assets of a business debtor. In that
analysis, a central consideration, discussed below, is that state laws
facilitating business reorganizations are not within the historical
police powers of the state, but rather are one of the core features of
federal bankruptcy law.
II. BLURRING BOUNDARIES BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS
As evidenced by the history of federal bankruptcy laws, a strong
and predictable business bankruptcy scheme is critical to economic
growth, market stability, and job creation and preservation.182 The
United States has been an innovator and leader in business
179. See Sherwood Partners, 394 F.3d at 1206-08 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1207.
181. See id. at 1206-08.
182. See, e.g., Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
1, 7-18 (2005) (explaining the development of U.S. bankruptcy laws and their contributions
to the U.S. economy and entrepreneurial initiatives, as well as how other countries attempt
to replicate U.S. bankruptcy laws to achieve similar objectives); see also American Bankruptcy
Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: 2012-2014 Final Report and Recom-
mendations, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (2015)  [hereinafter ABI Commission Report]
(discussing the role of bankruptcy law in the context of economic growth and stability). The
author served as the reporter to the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11.
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bankruptcy, particularly since the promulgation of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code.183 The Code introduced a “debtor in possession”
concept that allows a company’s management to stay in control of
the debtor’s business and reorganization efforts throughout the
chapter 11 case.184
Chapter 11 arguably occupies the field of business reorganiza-
tions. Congress and the Supreme Court nonetheless have recognized
the important role that state laws play in debtor-creditor matters
involving businesses. These state laws include ABCs and receiver-
ships, and they primarily focus on the collection and distribution of
a debtor’s assets.185 A few states have amended their laws, however,
to mimic key aspects of the Bankruptcy Code, including those
integral to facilitating reorganizations.186 This Section compares cer-
tain state debtor-creditor laws with the Bankruptcy Code and lays
the groundwork for an analysis of the constitutionality of such state
laws.
A. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code fosters the reorganization of
financially distressed companies.187 Congress enacted chapter 11 as
part of its overhaul of federal bankruptcy law in 1978.188 As a con-
ceptual matter, chapter 11 draws on the strengths of the prior
business reorganization chapters—in particular, Chapters X, XI,
and XII of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act—and strives to rehabilitate
distressed businesses while maximizing creditor recoveries.189 Both
the legislative history of chapter 11 and Supreme Court cases ap-
plying chapter 11 emphasize the importance of the rehabilitation
183. See Martin, supra note 182, at 2-7.
184. See ABI Commission Report, supra note 182, at 20-21.
185. For a general discussion of state law receiverships and ABCs, see 12 BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING §§ 155.01, 156.03 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. ed., 2017);
see also infra notes 332-34 and accompanying text. See generally THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE
LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986) (explaining and comparing the individual
creditor rights under state law with the collective remedy provided by federal bankruptcy
law).
186. See infra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
187. See ABI Commission Report, supra note 182, at 6.
188. See Tabb, supra note 20, at 35.
189. For a detailed explanation of each chapter under the Bankruptcy Act, see id. at 35-38.
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goal.190 For example, the House report explains, “The purpose of a
business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restruc-
ture a business’s finances so that it may continue to operate, provide
its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for
its stockholders.”191
A company commences a chapter 11 case by filing a petition with
the bankruptcy court.192 It does not have to be insolvent to do so.193
The filing triggers the protection of the court and the automatic stay
of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.194 The automatic stay, as its
name implies, immediately halts any litigation and collection ac-
tions against the debtor to the extent those matters relate to pre-
petition activities.195 It often is critical to the debtor’s reorganization
efforts, as it allows the debtor to catch its financial breath and
evaluate its reorganization alternatives.196 It also often provides any
creditors’ committee appointed in the case an opportunity to review
the financial affairs of the debtor in possession and to better moni-
tor the debtor’s conduct during the case.197
190. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (“The fundamental
purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant
loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.” (citing the 1978 House report refer-
enced infra note 191)).
191. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
192. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (“A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced
by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may
be a debtor under such chapter.”). In certain situations, creditors also may file an involuntary
petition for bankruptcy against a debtor under either chapter 7 (providing for a straight
liquidation of the debtor’s assets) or chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 303.
193. See, e.g., In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 510 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003) (“As a statutory
matter, it is clear that the bankruptcy law does not require that a bankruptcy debtor be
insolvent, either in the balance sheet sense (more liabilities than assets) or in the liquidity
sense (unable to pay the debtor’s debts as they come due), to file a chapter 11 case or proceed
to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.”), aff’d, 403 B.R. 668 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d,
721 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2013).
194. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (defining scope of automatic stay and explaining, among other
things, that a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay ... of ... the commencement or continu-
ation ... of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was
or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title”).
195. See id.
196. See A. Mechele Dickerson, The Many Faces of Chapter 11: A Reply to Professor Baird,
12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 109, 119 (2004) (“One primary benefit of filing for bankruptcy is
that it gives debtors the protection of the automatic stay, which prevents creditors from
seizing the debtors’ assets and also prevents landlords from immediately removing debtors
from leased premises (something that is especially beneficial for small businesses).”).
197. Section 1102(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, subject to certain exceptions,
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Traditionally, companies sought to reorganize under chapter 11
by negotiating and confirming chapter 11 plans of reorganiza-
tions.198 The chapter 11 plans represent a new contract between the
debtor and its creditors. Most plans restructure the debtor’s balance
sheet and streamline business operations by, for example, distribut-
ing the value of the business to prepetition creditors through new
debt and equity issuances, rejecting burdensome contracts and
leases, and selling noncore assets.199 The debtor’s prepetition equity
interests often are extinguished through this process, with some
creditors receiving all or a portion of the reorganized debtor’s equity
in satisfaction of their prepetition debt.200 Upon confirmation of the
plan, the debtor’s business continues with a new debt and equity
structure, and the debtor may receive a discharge from its prepeti-
tion obligations.201
More recently, distressed companies have been “reorganizing”
under chapter 11 by selling their businesses as going concerns free
of the debtor’s obligations.202 This strategy, similar to a traditional
“[T]he United States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims
and may appoint additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the United
States trustee deems appropriate.” 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). A creditors’ committee acts as a
statutory watchdog during the debtor’s chapter 11 case, monitoring the debtor in possession
and providing information to the court and the debtor’s general unsecured creditors. See
Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role
of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 749, 761-64 (2011) (ex-
plaining history of creditors’ committees in bankruptcy and providing citations to additional
resources).
198. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (outlining requirements for confirmation of a debtor’s plan of
reorganization); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2017); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?,
47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 144-45 (2005) (explaining the traditional process of reorganizing through
a plan).
199. See, e.g., 3A-33 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 33.08 (Theodore Eisenberg ed., 2017) (de-
scribing the general content of plans of reorganization).
200. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 198, ¶ 1129.03 (explaining elements of a
cram down of plans of reorganization that frequently include no recoveries to junior creditors
and equity interests).
201. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (“Effect of confirmation [of a plan of reorganization].”); 8 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 198, ¶ 1141.01 (explaining effect of plan confirmation).
202. See ABI Commission Report, supra note 182, at 219-23 (discussing the increasing use
of going-concern sales under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code and potential issues with
that development); see also Robert M. Fishman & Gordon E. Gouveia, What’s Driving Section
363 Sales After Chrysler and General Motors?, 19 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 351, 351 (2010) (noting
that 363 sales “have increasingly dominated the bankruptcy landscape in recent years”);
James H.M. Sprayregen et al., Chapter 11: Not Perfect But Better than the Alternative, AM.
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plan of reorganization under chapter 11, permits the business to
continue to operate after the bankruptcy case, free of legacy costs
and other prepetition obligations.203 Under both a plan and a going-
concern reorganization sale, prepetition equity holders or new
equity holders may own the post-bankruptcy business, with the
latter (a change of control) occurring in most cases.204 Although the
“debtor” does not receive a statutory “discharge” in the sale context,
the Bankruptcy Code and the court’s order authorizing the sale
cleanse the business of prepetition obligations in a manner mirror-
ing the statutory discharge.205
Although several aspects of the Bankruptcy Code facilitate a
debtor’s reorganization under chapter 11, a few specific provisions
merit special mention. For example, the following provisions give a
debtor the time and the ability to finance and streamline its
business operations: section 362 automatically stays most kinds of
prepetition litigation and collection actions against the debtor;206
BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2005, at 1, 62-63.
203. See ABI Commission Report, supra note 182, at 220-23.
204. See id. at 221.
205. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (authorizing the sale of a debtor’s assets free of interests).
Notably, many courts interpret section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code to release all claims and
interests, including successor liability and environmental claims, against the debtor’s assets.
See, e.g., Robert G. Sable et al., When the 363 Sale Is the Best Route, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
121, 123 (2006) (explaining the scope and advantages of free and clear sale). This result is
akin to that obtained under section 1141(c) (effect of confirmation of a plan), which provides,
“[T]he property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors.”
11 U.S.C. § 1141(c); Joel M. Gross & Christopher Anderson, Classic Chapter 11 Reorgani-
zations Versus Section 363 Sales and the Effects on Environmental Cleanup Obligations, 2010
ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 3 (suggesting that section 363(f) may be even broader than a plan
discharge). Moreover, the protection provided to the purchaser of the debtor’s assets under
section 363(f) is akin to the “discharge” of the debtor provided by section 1141(d) upon
confirmation of a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d). In both instances, the debtor’s assets and the own-
er of those assets are freed from prepetition claims; prepetition creditors are forced to look
solely to the sale proceeds or to the recoveries provided by the plan. In each scenario, prepeti-
tion creditors also may have access to the proceeds of avoidance or other actions pursued by
the estate or post-confirmation trust, but again the limited nature of recourse is similar.
There effectively remains no entity against which prepetition creditors can assert their
claims. See also Dickerson, supra note 196, at 119-20 (explaining breadth of free and clear
sales); Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process
in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 875-89 (2014) (noting that 363 sales have
become the preferred method of selling distressed companies because of the ability to sell
assets free and clear and also discussing potential issues posed by the increasing use of quick
going-concern sales in bankruptcy).
206. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
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section 364 allows a debtor in possession to obtain postpetition
financing on terms that it could not otherwise obtain outside of
bankruptcy without the consent of pre-existing lenders—for exam-
ple, new credit backed by a pari passu or senior lien on the debtor’s
collateral;207 section 365 authorizes the debtor in possession to as-
sume, assume and assign, or reject prepetition executory contracts
and unexpired leases;208 and section 363 provides the debtor in pos-
session defined rights to sell, use, and lease its assets.209 The debtor
in possession can use these provisions to sell noncore assets and,
together with the rejection of contracts and leases under section
365,210 create efficiencies in its business operations during its
bankruptcy case.
In addition, as explained above, one of the primary goals of
chapter 11 is the rehabilitation of the debtor’s business.211 Chapter
11 fosters this goal by allowing the debtor in possession to confirm
a plan of reorganization under section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code
with, or, under certain circumstances, without the support of all
creditors.212 Section 1129 contemplates a debtor selling its business
through the plan process.213 A court will typically also permit the
debtor in possession to sell its business as a going concern under
section 363.214
207. Id. § 364.
208. This provision allows the debtor to make this decision in its business judgment for
most kinds of contracts and leases without the consent of the nondebtor counterparty. Id.
§ 365.
209. The debtor in possession also can sell all or substantially all of its assets under section
363, facilitating a going-concern reorganization sale of the business. The debtor in possession
can pursue both one-off asset sales and going-concern reorganization sales “free and clear” of
all liens and encumbrances under section 363(f). Id. § 363.
210. Id. § 365.
211. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220
(1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 (“The premise of a business reorgan-
ization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for which they were
designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.”).
212. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
213. See id. §§ 1123(a)(5), 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (discussing sale in cramdown context); 7
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 198, ¶ 1129.04[2][b][i] (“The plan must anticipate a sale,
either contained in the plan itself, or postconfirmation. Inclusion of the sale in the plan is not
troublesome as section 1123 expressly anticipates that a sale of all or some assets can be a
means to implement the plan.”).
214. See, e.g., Jacoby & Janger, supra note 205, at 883-89 (discussing examples of going-
concern sales under section 363); Alla Raykin, Comment, Section 363 Sales: Mooting Due
Process?, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 91, 107-11 (2012) (same).
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If the debtor in possession confirms a plan of reorganization, the
reorganized debtor—in other words, the business that continues
operating after confirmation and the effective date of the plan—re-
ceives the benefit of a discharge under section 1141.215 A business
that liquidates under chapter 11 is not eligible to receive a discharge
under that section.216 Nevertheless, an order authorizing a going-
concern reorganization sale of the debtor’s business free of liens and
encumbrances has essentially the same effect as a confirmed plan,
in that the debtor’s business continues after the bankruptcy and the
business is free of the debtor’s prepetition obligations.217
In contrast to chapter 11, chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code offers
a process to liquidate a debtor’s assets to pay creditors.218 A trustee
replaces the debtor’s management upon or shortly after the filing of
the chapter 7 petition, and the trustee’s primary objective is to
identify, collect, and liquidate the debtor’s assets for the benefit of
creditors. Although the court may authorize the chapter 7 trustee
to continue the debtor’s business and even seek a going-concern sale
under section 363, those sales much more frequently occur in
chapter 11 under the direction of the company’s management.219 A
business debtor does not receive a discharge in a chapter 7 case.220
B. State Debtor-Creditor Laws
A variety of state laws affect the debtor-creditor relationship.
State law has traditionally governed the formation and enforcement
215. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
216. See id. § 1141(d)(3)(A).
217. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 205, at 893 (“At least in theory, these sales can pre-
serve going-concern value and transfer clear title to complex assets—from software licenses
to whole companies, solving fragmentation and assemblage problems, and addressing issues
of successor liability in relatively short order.”); see also supra note 205.
218. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 198, ¶ 700.01 (explaining basic elements
of chapter 7 bankruptcy). State debtor-creditor law and chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code
have historically overlapped to the extent that both seek to liquidate a debtor’s assets to pay
creditors’ claims. See infra Part II.B. This Article focuses primarily on the increasing overlap
between state debtor-creditor law and chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code because the
reorganization objective is reserved to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, that
overlap more vividly illustrates the potential and significant conflicts between state law and
the provisions and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
219. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 198, ¶ 721.02.
220. See id. ¶ 700.05 (explaining the scope of discharge in chapter 7).
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of contracts underlying the relationship, as well as creditors’ basic
rights and remedies upon a default by the debtor.221 Aspects of state
property law, commercial law, and business law, among others, may
be relevant to any given business debtor’s obligations to creditors.
That debtor’s default may trigger a state law foreclosure action,
collection action, or fraudulent transfer action.222 It also may result
in an assignment for the benefit of creditors or a receivership, in
which the receiver is charged with the preservation and perhaps
liquidation of the debtor’s assets.223
In general, state debtor-creditor laws focus on creditors’ rem-
edies.224 For example, a plaintiff in litigation may seek the appoint-
ment of a receiver to preserve the defendant’s assets pending
resolution of the litigation.225 This use of a receiver helps to ensure
that the defendant has assets to pay any damages award.226 A court 
may also appoint a receiver upon the dissolution of a company or
upon the request of a company, its shareholders, or its creditors to
facilitate the liquidation of the company’s assets and the payment
of creditors’ claims from the proceeds.227 Such a receiver may receive
general authority over all of the company’s assets or limited author-
ity over certain assets subject to a particular creditor’s liens.228 A
distressed company also may use an ABC to achieve similar
221. See supra note 27 (discussing creditors’ remedies under state law); see also Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and defined by state
law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such
interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding.”).
222. See COMM. ON BANKR. & CORP. REORGANIZATION, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, NON-BANKRUPTCY
ALTERNATIVES TO RESTRUCTURINGS AND ASSET SALES, 1, 3-4 (2010).
223. See 12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING, supra note 191, §§ 155.01,
156.03.
224. See, e.g., Steve H. Nickles, Radical Reductionism in Debtor-Creditor Law, 39 CATH.
U. L. REV. 765, 765 (1990) (explaining that state debtor-creditor laws “serve two main
purposes. It describes when and how property of a debtor is forcibly taken and applied to
satisfaction of debt. Equally important, debtor-creditor law also determines the order of
paying the debtor’s creditors from the property.”).
225. See, e.g., Robert H. O’Brien, Giving and Receiving: A Local Judge Offers Insights on
the Proper Use and Scope of Receiverships, L.A. LAW., Jan. 1997, at 40, 42 (explaining use of
receivers in the litigation context under California state law).
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-507.1 (2016) (providing for the appointment of a receiver
“[w]hen a corporation becomes insolvent or suspends its ordinary business for want of funds,
or is in imminent danger of insolvency”).
228. See id. § 1-507.2.
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results.229 In an ABC, the debtor assigns all of its assets to a trustee
or assignee, who then liquidates those assets to pay creditors’
claims.230
State receivership and ABC law may be governed by statute or
developed under the common law.231 Consequently, state law varies
on these kinds of creditor remedies.232 Most states authorize the
appointment of a receiver if the debtor is insolvent or in danger of
becoming insolvent, wasting assets, or dissolving.233 The scope of the
receiver’s duties and powers may include preserving the assets,
liquidating the assets, and paying creditors.234 The receiver also may
have the authority to pursue claims and causes of action on behalf
of the debtor and to object to creditors’ claims.235 In these contexts,
the receiver has traditionally been viewed as a neutral fiduciary
appointed by the court to facilitate the payment of creditors.236
229. See, e.g., Carly Landon, Note, Making Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors as Easy
as A-B-C, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1451, 1456-58 (2014).
230. See id. at 1456-57.
231. See 12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING, supra note 185, § 156.03 (noting
that “an assignment for the benefit of creditors is based on trust law, sometimes supple-
mented or modified by a specific state statute”). For a discussion of equity receiverships under
common law, see infra Part III.B.
232. See GEOFFREY L. BERMAN, GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS 3
(David Gould ed., 3d ed. 2015) (noting that the law governing ABCs “varies from state to
state”); Morrison, supra note 7, at 258 n.4 (observing variance in state law and noting, “An
ABC, for example, is regulated by statute and overseen by courts in New York; it is
unregulated and requires no court involvement in Illinois”).
233. See 12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING, supra note 185, § 155.01.
234. See id. § 155.04.
235. For example, in the context of insolvent corporations, the Delaware General Corporate
Law provides:
Whenever a corporation shall be insolvent, the Court of Chancery, on the appli-
cation of any creditor or stockholder thereof, may, at any time, appoint 1 or more
persons to be receivers of and for the corporation, to take charge of its assets,
estate, effects, business and affairs, and to collect the outstanding debts, claims,
and property due and belonging to the corporation, with power to prosecute and
defend, in the name of the corporation or otherwise, all claims or suits, to ap-
point an agent or agents under them, and to do all other acts which might be
done by the corporation and which may be necessary or proper. The powers of
the receivers shall be such and shall continue so long as the Court shall deem
necessary.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 291 (2017); see also id. § 279 (providing a similar right to pursue
claims for trustees and receivers of dissolved corporations).
236. See JONATHAN P. FRIEDLAND, STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR AND AGAINST DISTRESSED
BUSINESSES § 1:6 (Robert Hammeke & Elizabeth B. Vandesteeg eds., 2017) (“A receiver is a
fiduciary charged with the preservation or operation of assets pending some other
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Over time, states have amended their receivership and ABC stat-
utes to enlarge the role and powers of the receiver or assignee and
the purpose of the receivership or ABC in the distressed company
context.237 For example, state receivership laws may authorize the
receiver to pursue not only claims and causes of action held by the
debtor, which constitute part of the debtor’s assets, but also
individual creditor remedies such as fraudulent transfer and
preference actions.238 Moreover, some states have modified and ex-
panded their receivership statutes (and, in at least two states,
extended these powers to assignees in ABCs) to look like mini
Bankruptcy Codes.239 These enhanced statutes include, for example,
the imposition of an automatic stay, the unilateral treatment of
contracts and leases, and the sale of the business as an operating
entity (or going concern) free of the debtor’s obligations.240 Several
of these changes in particular raise questions concerning the Bank-
ruptcy Clause and federal preemption and potential violations of the
Contract Clause.
The State of Washington’s Receivership Act is a good example of
the various changes being incorporated into an integrated scheme
of receivership that mimics the Bankruptcy Code. As one summary
of the statute explains, “The 2004 amendments greatly improved
disposition.”).
237. Since 2003, at least seven states have amended their receivership statutes to grant
more extensive powers to receivers. See Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143, art. 1, 2012 Minn.
Laws 51 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 576.21-.53 (2016)); Missouri Commercial
Receivership Act, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 515.500-.665 (2016) (effective Aug. 28, 2016); Act of Dec.
19, 2014, sec. 1, 2014 Ohio Laws 159 (codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2735.01, .02, .04 (West 2017)); Receiverships, 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 591 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 7.60 (2016)); ARK. R. CIV. P. 66 (2017) (amended Mar. 13,
2003); MASS. R. CIV. P. 66 (2017) (amended June 24, 2009); UTAH R. CIV. P. 66 (2017)
(amended May 1, 2014); see also infra notes 332-34 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding a California state preference law preempted by the Bankruptcy Code); Ready
Fixtures Co. v. Stevens Cabinets, 488 F. Supp. 2d 787, 790-92 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (upholding
a receiver’s right under Wisconsin state law to recover alleged preferential transfers and
disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Sherwood Partners).
239. See MINN. STAT. § 577.18 (2016) (providing that an assignment for the benefit of
creditors is governed generally by MINN. STAT. §§ 576.21-.53); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.08.030(1)
(providing that the debtor must consent to have the assignment for the benefit of creditors
governed generally by WASH. REV. CODE ch. 7.60).
240. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 576.21-.53; Missouri Commercial Receivership Act, MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 515.500-.665; WASH. REV. CODE ch. 7.60; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2735.04
(authorizing sales free and clear).
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the Act, and were largely aimed at making it function more like the
Bankruptcy Code.”241 The Washington statute authorizes a court to
appoint both general and custodial receivers.242 The statute further
explains, “A receiver must be a general receiver if the receiver is ap-
pointed to take possession and control of all or substantially all of
a person’s property with authority to liquidate that property and, in
the case of a business over which the receiver is appointed, wind up
affairs.”243 Both the court and the receiver (which includes an as-
signee in an ABC) have broad powers under the Receivership Act.244
In addition, the amendments to the Receivership Act adopted in
2004 introduced, among other things, an automatic stay, the ability
to sell assets free of liens and encumbrances, and the assumption or
rejection of executory contracts and unexpired leases. Each of these
provisions generally tracks the language of the Bankruptcy Code,
but as noted here and below, there are important differences
throughout the statute. For example, the Receivership Act imple-
ments a stay of litigation and collection actions against the debtor
and its property for a period of sixty days, which may be extended
by the court.245 This stay does not, however, extend to pending liti-
gation initiated by a creditor who sought the receivership.246
The Receivership Act also authorizes the “receiver [to] assume or
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the person over
whose property the receiver is appointed upon order of the court
241. KING COUNTY BAR ASS’N, WASHINGTON STATE RECEIVERSHIP ACT (CH. 7.60 RCW), 2011
AMENDMENTS (ENGROSSED HOUSE BILL 5058 2) (2011), https://www.kcba.org/streaming/Docu
ments/BANK-Handout_Sept2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY89-TQEQ].
242. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.015.
243. Id.
244. The statute, for example, provides,
Except as otherwise provided for by this chapter, the court in all cases has
exclusive authority over the receiver, and the exclusive possession and right of
control with respect to all real property and all tangible and intangible personal
property with respect to which the receiver is appointed, wherever located, and
the exclusive jurisdiction to determine all controversies relating to the collection,
preservation, application, and distribution of all the property.
Id. § 7.60.055(1). A receiver can, among other things, operate the debtor’s business and pursue
claims not only of the debtor, but also fraudulent transfer claims of the debtor’s creditors. See
id. §§ 7.60.060(1), 19.40.071(a)(3)(ii), amended by S. 5085, 65 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
245. Id. § 7.60.110(2).
246. See id. § 7.60.110(3)(a). Notably, the automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code
generally does extend to such creditors, placing all creditors on a more level playing field. See
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2012).
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following notice to the other party to the contract or lease upon
notice and a hearing.”247 This provision overrides ipso facto claus-
es—allowing the receiver to assume or reject a contract or lease
despite a provision terminating the agreement upon certain condi-
tions relating to the debtor’s financial condition—and relegates any
claims of the counterparty upon rejection to a pre-receivership
claim.248 Moreover, subject to certain limited exceptions, the Receiv-
ership Act permits the sale of the debtor’s property “free and clear
of liens and of all rights of redemption, whether or not the sale will
generate proceeds sufficient to fully satisfy all claims secured by the
property.”249
A receiver under the Washington Receivership Act is authorized
to operate the debtor’s business, obtain receivership financing, pur-
sue the debtor’s claims and causes of action, invoke the rights of
individual creditors, and object to claims submitted in the receiver-
ship.250 The statute also limits the rights of utilities upon the com-
mencement of the receivership in a manner similar to section 366
of the Bankruptcy Code,251 and it bars creditors who fail to submit
timely proofs of claim from participating in distributions.252 The Act
purports to bind all creditors, providing that 
[c]reditors and parties in interest to whom written notice of the
pendency of the receivership is given in accordance with RCW
7.60.210, and creditors or other persons submitting written
claims in the receivership or otherwise appearing and participat-
ing in the receivership, are bound by the acts of the receiver with
247. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.130(1).
248. See id. § 7.60.130(2)-(3). These provisions are among the traditional reorganization
powers of a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(e), (g).
249. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.260(2). The statute further provides, 
Orders of the court with respect to the treatment of claims and disposition of es-
tate property, including but not limited to orders providing for sales of property
free and clear of liens, are effective as to any person having a claim against or
interest in the receivership estate and who has actual knowledge of the receiv-
ership, whether or not the person receives written notice from the receiver and
whether or not the person appears or participates in the receivership.
Id. § 7.60.190(4).
250. Id. §§ 7.60.060(1), 7.60.140(1), 7.60.160(1), 7.60.220(1).
251. Compare id. § 7.60.120, with 11 U.S.C. § 366.
252. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.210(1).
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regard to management and disposition of estate property wheth-
er or not they are formally joined as parties.253
Under the Act, a receiver can sell the debtor’s business as a going
concern free of all liens and encumbrances, as well as reject burden-
some executory contracts and leases.254 This process allows the dis-
tressed business to continue in operation post-receivership while
barring pre-receivership creditors from pursuing claims against the
business. Yet creditors do not receive the same treatment and protec-
tions as under the Bankruptcy Code.
For example, under the Washington statute, a secured creditor’s
after-acquired property clause extends to post-receivership property;
this treatment differs from the scope of permissible after-acquired
property clauses in bankruptcy.255 The priority scheme for distribu-
tion purposes varies,256 and contract rights may be terminated with-
out certain protections typically afforded to counterparties by the
Bankruptcy Code or the Constitution.257 Creditors are not able to
depose, or conduct an inquiry of, the debtor as under Bankruptcy
Rule 2004, which often allows individual creditors to determine
issues relating to their claims and the location of various assets,
wherever located.258 The state law does not provide full “safe harbor”
protections for qualified financial contracts (for example, swap
agreements, securities contracts, forward contracts, commodities
contracts, and repurchase agreements), subjecting these contracts
and any payments made thereunder to the powers of the receiver.259
253. Id. § 7.60.190(1).
254. Id. §§ 7.60.260(1), 7.60.130(1).
255. Compare id. § 7.60.240, with 11 U.S.C. § 552(a).
256. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.230, with 11 U.S.C. § 507(a).
257. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.130, with 11 U.S.C. § 365(b).
258. The receiver may have the ability to depose the debtor, see WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.60.060(1)(i), but that is different from Bankruptcy Rule 2004, which provides that “[o]n
motion of any party in interest, the court may order the examination of any entity.” FED. R.
BANKR. P. 2004(a). The term “party in interest,” in turn, is defined broadly, and parties in
interest generally have standing to appear and be heard on any matter in a chapter 11
bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b).
259. The Bankruptcy Code generally exempts qualified financial contracts from the auto-
matic stay, preference, and fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Code, as well as permits
parties to terminate and close out those contracts (despite provisions in the Code that override
ipso facto clauses). See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(27), 546(e)-(g), (j), 555, 556, 559, 560,
561(a), 562. State law may pick up a few of these protections (or none at all), but differences
in coverage and application will likely exist. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.110(3)(g)
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In addition, it is unclear whether state law provides the same robust
noticing of creditors or the same level of court oversight as under
the Bankruptcy Code;260 state law certainly does not provide for the
appointment of a creditors’ committee or oversight by an independ-
ent party, such as the U.S. Trustee or Bankruptcy Administrator,
thus limiting protections available for unsecured creditors.261
Notably, Washington is not the only state to expand its receiver-
ship laws to foster the continuation of distressed businesses through
a process that alters the rights of creditors and other stakehold-
ers.262 Minnesota and Missouri have each enacted receivership stat-
utes that contain some, if not all, of the provisions included in the
Washington statute discussed above.263 Moreover, as noted above,
(exempting the set off of certain claims under certain qualified financial contracts from the
automatic stay).
260. The federal bankruptcy rules contain numerous provisions that require extensive
noticing of certain pleadings, orders, and hearings to all creditors, regardless of whether the
creditor has filed a claim. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002 (general notices); FED. R. BANKR.
P. 6004(a) (sales).
261. Cf., e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (appointment of committee); id. § 1103 (powers of the
committee); 28 U.S.C. § 586(a) (2012) (setting forth the duties of the U.S. Trustee). Two states,
Alabama and North Carolina, use Bankruptcy Administrators in lieu of participation in the
U.S. Trustee program. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9035 advisory committee’s note. For a discussion
of the independent parties overseeing a chapter 11 debtor in possession, see John Wm. Butler,
Jr. et al., Preserving State Corporate Governance Law in Chapter 11: Maximizing Value
Through Traditional Fiduciaries, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 337, 343-50 (2010). Notably,
an assignee in an ABC or a receiver in a receivership is often selected by the debtor or the
secured creditor. It is unclear whether the assignee or receiver acts as a fiduciary for the
company, the appointing creditors, all creditors, or all stakeholders. See, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.60.060(2) (addressing general duties of a receiver, including to comply with state law
and court orders, but it is unclear what exactly that entails).
262. The expansion of state ABC and receivership laws to mimic the Bankruptcy Code
should be distinguished from, for example, state insurance laws that follow the form and
substance of the Bankruptcy Code in certain respects. Certain entities, such as insurance
companies, cannot be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. Congress carved out these entities
from the Bankruptcy Code, thereby eliminating potential preemption issues. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(b).
263. See MINN. STAT. §§ 576.21-.53 (2016); Missouri Commercial Receivership Act, MO.
REV. STAT. §§ 515.500-.665 (2016). Interestingly, Ohio also amended its receivership laws, but
limited those amendments to clarifying the receiver’s ability to sell assets free and clear. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2735.04(D) (West 2017). This targeted clarification of the receiver’s power
to transfer assets to pay creditors’ claims may mitigate many of the issues identified in this
Article in the context of integrated receivership schemes that mimic many provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. See M. Colette Gibbons & Jason Grimes, A Model Statute for Free-and-
Clear Sales by Equity Receivers, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2009, at 50, 78-79 (explaining past
conflict in Ohio law permitting sales free of liens and interests by receivers).
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the Washington and Minnesota statutes grant assignees in ABCs
rights and powers akin to receivers under these receivership acts.264
Commentators readily note the strong resemblance between these
amended state statutes and federal bankruptcy law.265
C. Potential Implications of Changes to State Debtor-Creditor
Laws
States historically have adopted laws to facilitate the liquidation
of debtors’ assets. These laws allow states to assist their residents,
including business entities, with a timely and cost-effective distrib-
ution of a debtor’s assets in satisfaction of creditors’ claims. That
kind of basic liquidation mechanism is an important component of
debtor-creditor law. But the extension of these laws to include pro-
cesses that enable a distressed business to continue despite not
paying its creditors raises serious preemption questions that are
underdeveloped in the existing literature. This is not to say that
laws promoting the rehabilitation of distressed businesses are ill-
advised. Rather, the critical question is whether federal and state
bankruptcy laws that facilitate such relief can coexist in light of the
Bankruptcy Clause and other constitutional concerns.
The following Section analyzes these state law developments in
light of the Bankruptcy and Contract Clauses, along with the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the enforcement of these consti-
tutional provisions. Although Congress could expressly preempt
state bankruptcy laws,266 it has not yet chosen to do so other than in
the limited context of chapter 9.267 Accordingly, the inquiry focuses
264. See supra note 16.
265. See, e.g., John Young, Jr., Missouri Commercial Receivership Act Creates a New
Statutory Scheme Which Presents a More Robust Remedy, JDSUPRA (Aug. 3, 2016), http://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/missouri-commercial-receivership-act-37797/ [https://perma.cc/
KG6R-7SK9] (“Many subjects covered by the MCRA [amended Missouri receivership statute]
are similar to federal bankruptcy provisions, such as [the automatic stay, executory contract,
and sale provisions].”).
266. See Marine Harbor Props., Inc. v. Mfrs. Tr. Co., 317 U.S. 78, 83 (1942) (“The federal
bankruptcy power is, of course, paramount and supreme and may be so exercised by Congress
as to exclude every competing or conflicting proceeding in state or federal tribunals.”).
267. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (preempting certain state laws concerning the adjustment of debts for
municipal debtors). The preemption issue in the chapter 9 context (and perhaps the state
debtor-creditor law context discussed in Part II.B of this Article) raises interesting federalism
questions that are subject to much scholarly debate. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism
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on implied preemption under the field and conflict preemption doc-
trines.268 State bankruptcy laws not only conflict with federal bank-
ruptcy law in certain instances, but they also subject creditors to
disparate treatment and undermine the uniformity of bankruptcy
laws.
III. THE NEED TO RETHINK BOUNDARIES TO ACHIEVE THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE
The Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress the authority to establish
uniform laws “on the subject of Bankruptcies.”269 The concept of a
“fresh start” that allows a debtor to rehabilitate its financial affairs
and remove its future assets from the reach of creditors is the
essence of bankruptcy law.270 As the Supreme Court has explained
in the consumer debtor context, “‘One of the primary purposes of the
bankruptcy act’ is to give debtors ‘a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and dis-
couragement of preëxisting debt.’”271 Congress adopted this core
principle for business debtors as well when it enacted chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code.272 In doing so, it left no room for states to
legislate concerning a change of control of distressed businesses that
replicates a chapter 11 result. State laws that conflict with, or pose
an obstacle to, bankruptcy protections also undermine the purposes
of chapter 11. This Section explains the implied preemption issues
created by state statutes authorizing going concern sales in an
environment akin to chapter 11 and explores the appropriate roles
for federal and state laws in the context of distressed businesses.273
Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 58-59, 58 n.20 (2016)
(explaining the issue and collecting articles).
268. See supra note 30.
269. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
270. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
271. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (quoting Hunt, 292 U.S. at 244)
(preempting a state motor vehicle law that authorized suspension of debtor’s driver’s license
if certain judgments not paid as violating bankruptcy discharge).
272. Both the confirmation discharge and a going-concern reorganization sale free of
preexisting claims effect a fresh start. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(f), 1141; see also supra note 205.
273. See generally Tabb, supra note 20, at 47-49 (explaining preemption in the bankruptcy
context).
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A. Congress’s Intended Purpose in Enacting Chapter 11
Congress enacted chapter 11 to allow distressed businesses to
continue to operate and ultimately reorganize, thereby saving jobs
and preserving the business’s role in its industry and community.274
Chapter 11 also contains protections for creditors, and it seeks to
treat all creditors fairly throughout the process and in distribu-
tions.275 State laws that attempt to replicate chapter 11 reorganiza-
tions—whether a plan or sale reorganization—directly compete with
the federal platform created by Congress and conflict with chapter
11’s core objectives and purposes. State laws that facilitate a
transfer of a debtor’s business as an operating entity (or going
concern), free of existing obligations and without counterparty
consents, compromise the interests of both debtors and creditors,
particularly creditors junior in a debtor’s capital structure.
A business that is facing a liquidity crisis or is otherwise unable
to pay its debt obligations can liquidate (sell its assets on a piece-
meal basis, using the proceeds to pay creditors), or it can try to con-
tinue to operate while reorganizing its financial and ownership
structure. The latter can be accomplished through a variety of
schemes, including a debt-for-equity exchange, a capital infusion for
new equity interests, or a going-concern sale.276 In each of these ap-
proaches the business continues, usually under new ownership. If
the new owners assume all of the existing debt obligations, or all
creditors and contract parties consent to the transaction, then the
restructuring can be done by private contract and under applicable
274. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (“In proceedings un-
der the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a troubled enterprise may be
restructured to enable it to operate successfully in the future.... By permitting reorganization,
Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy creditors’
claims, and to produce a return for its owners. Congress presumed that the assets of the debt-
or would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap.’” (citations
omitted)).
275. For example, the automatic stay protects not only the debtor, but also other creditors
from one creditor dismantling the debtor’s assets and keeping the value solely for itself. See
11 U.S.C. § 362(a). In addition, a trustee’s avoidance and turnover powers, which reach all of
a debtor’s assets wherever located in accordance with a bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction,
protect creditors. See id. §§ 542-559.
276. For a general overview of out-of-court restructuring alternatives, see 1-2 STEVEN R.
GROSS ET AL., COLLIER BUSINESS WORKOUT GUIDE ¶¶ 2.01-.50 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 2016).
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nonbankruptcy law.277 However, if the new owners want to unilater-
ally strip some (or all) existing obligations from the business, pick
and choose contracts necessary to continue to operate the business,
and obtain a court order protecting themselves and the business
from liability, the transaction must be accomplished through a
federal bankruptcy case.278 That result flows directly from the
purpose of chapter 11 and the Supreme Court’s precedent eschewing
state laws that free debtors’ assets from the claims of existing cred-
itors.279
1. Implied Field Preemption
As discussed above, the Bankruptcy Clause is closely related to
the Commerce Clause and, among other things, protects parties
from discrimination and unfair treatment in commercial transac-
tions and debtor-creditor relations.280 Congress was mindful of these
issues and of due process concerns in considering a federal bank-
ruptcy law that freed a debtor and its assets from creditors’
claims.281 The Bankruptcy Code, including chapter 11, incorporates
significant protections for creditors in cases that cut off the credi-
tors’ rights against the debtor and its assets. For example, the Code
requires that all creditors (not just lienholders) receive notice and
an opportunity to be heard, and the Code establishes a process and
imposes limitations on unilateral treatment of contracts and leas-
es.282 The bankruptcy court also has expansive jurisdiction over the
debtor’s assets wherever located and offers a national forum to
resolve disputes concerning any proposed plan, sale, or discharge.283
277. See id.; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 236, § 1:4 (explaining general attributes of
compositions under state law).
278. See supra Part II.A.
279. See supra Part I.C.
280. See supra Part I.A.
281. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 51 (2008)
(“Chapter 11 strikes a balance between a debtor’s interest in reorganizing and restructuring
its debts and the creditors’ interest in maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.” (citing
Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991))).
282. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b), 365(a) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002 (general notice re-
quirements); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001 (relief from stay); FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004 (use, sale, or
leas of property); FED. R. BANKR. P. 6006 (assumption or rejection of executory contract or
unexpired lease).
283. The district courts’ jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters is addressed by 28 U.S.C.
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Consequently, creditors doing business with an entity understand,
and have certainty regarding, their rights if the debtor defaults and
wants to avoid liability through a nonconsensual transaction in
bankruptcy.
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly preempt state
law in the context of the reorganization of a business by either a
plan or sale, the overall scheme of the Bankruptcy Code, and its
history, strongly support a finding of implied field preemption.284
Congress clearly intended to foster business reorganization under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.285 Congress did not define
“reorganization” in the Code, but courts have “interpret[ed] ‘reorgani-
zation’ to include all types of debt adjustment, including going-
concern asset sales.”286 When a state scheme imposes an automatic
stay on creditors’ and other parties’ rights against the debtor, allows
a third party to operate and sell the business free of claims, and
permits that third party to unilaterally assume or reject contracts
or leases, the scheme addresses precisely the same reorganization
subject matter as the Bankruptcy Code.287 The Supreme Court found
this kind of parallel regulation impermissible in Arizona v. United
States.288 In that case, the Court explained, “Field preemption re-
flects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in
the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.”289 
The Court also has repeatedly described a discharge of a debtor’s
financial obligations as one of the hallmarks of a bankruptcy law
that is within the exclusive purview of Congress under the Bank-
§ 1334. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012). Section 1334(e) provides the district court with “jurisdiction
... of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case,
and of property of the estate.” Id. § 1334(e). The bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, a referral of
the district court’s jurisdiction, is addressed in 28 U.S.C. § 157. Id. § 157.
284. See supra Part I.D.
285. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
286. In re Walter Energy, Inc., 542 B.R. 859, 880 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2015), aff’d sub nom.
United Mine Workers of Am. Combined Benefit Fund v. Walter Energy, Inc., 551 B.R. 631
(N.D. Ala. 2016), and aff’d sub nom. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Plan & Tr.
v. Walter Energy, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-0057-RDP, 2016 WL 2894091 (N.D. Ala. May 18, 2016),
appeal filed, No. 16-13483 (11th Cir. June 13, 2016).
287. See supra notes 6, 194, and 202 and accompanying text.
288. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (finding parallel state immigration laws impermissible);
see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
289. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249
(1984)).
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ruptcy Clause.290 A “discharge” is commonly defined as an act that
liberates, frees, or releases a person or thing.291 For example, section
1141 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a plan “discharges the
debtor from any debt” and that all “property dealt with by the plan
is free and clear of all claims and interests.”292 This formal discharge
falls squarely within the preemption lines drawn by Stellwagen v.
Clum,293 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,294 and Pobreslo v. Joseph
M. Boyd Co.295 Consequently, chapter 11 would preempt any state
law that provided a discharge to the debtor, its ongoing business, or
its property under a plan or arrangement. 
For both practical and doctrinal reasons, however, field preemp-
tion can and should extend to features of the Bankruptcy Code
beyond the technical “discharge” of a debtor. For example, section
363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code also authorizes the sale of the debt-
or’s property “free and clear of any interest in such property.”296
Notably, the language of the statute does not include “claims.”297
Nevertheless, particularly in the context of going-concern reorgani-
zation sales, courts often approve a broad release of all interests,
liens, and claims against the property.298 In these scenarios, from
the perspective of the ongoing business and the creditors who can no
longer pursue the business’s assets to collect their claims, there is
little meaningful difference between the respective practical effects
of sections 1141 and 363.299
290. See supra Part I.C.
291. For a complete definition of “discharge,” see, for example, Discharge, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discharge [https://perma.
cc/Q69S-GN3Y].
292. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c)-(d)(1)(A) (2012).
293. 245 U.S. 605, 615 (1918).
294. 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
295. 287 U.S. 518, 526 (1933).
296. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
297. See id.
298. See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
trend seems to be toward a more expansive reading of ‘interests in property’ which ‘encom-
passes other obligations that may flow from ownership of the property.’” (quoting 3 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 198, ¶ 363.06[1])); WBQ P’ship v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep’t of
Med. Assistance Servs. (In re WBQ P’ship), 189 B.R. 97, 105 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).
299. Notably, the statutory language of the two sections does differ, but the imple-
mentation of this language by courts and parties leads to similar practical results. See also
supra note 205. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c), with id. § 363(f).
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In fact, these scenarios correspond with the notion of “discharge”
for businesses discussed in the legislative history to the Bankruptcy
Code. For example, the Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws in the United States, reviewed in connection with the enact-
ment of the Bankruptcy Code, explains, “In a reorganization case a
corporation in effect obtains a discharge to the extent a reorganiza-
tion plan binds creditors to satisfaction of less than the full amounts
of their claims.”300 A going-concern reorganization sale in effect
“binds” creditors in the same manner. In both instances, debtors
and creditors deserve the protections and certainty of the federal
bankruptcy laws. Accordingly, chapter 11 should likewise preempt
state laws purporting to facilitate going-concern reorganization
sales that impair the rights and claims of creditors.
2. Implied Conflict Preemption
In addition, state law schemes of this nature create an actual
conflict with the Bankruptcy Code.301 These schemes essentially give
debtors and creditors an option to file a state or federal reorganiza-
tion case, with each having potentially different results. State law
schemes may differ from key aspects of the Bankruptcy Code, such
as whether a secured creditor’s after-acquired property clause
continues after the proceeding is commenced.302 A difference in this
one small provision may make a state proceeding more favorable for
the secured creditor and significantly worse for the unsecured
300. COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., COMMUNICATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING A
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES—JULY 1973,
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2, at 134 (1973).
301. This conclusion is supported not only by the Court’s implied conflict preemption
precedent, but also the Supremacy Clause. As Chief Justice Marshall explained in Gibbons
v. Ogden, 
The appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers the same
supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the State Legislatures as do
not transcend their powers, but, though enacted in the execution of acknow-
ledged State powers, interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress,
made in pursuance of the constitution, or some treaty made under the authority
of the United States.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824); see also Dawson, supra note 7 (discussing, among other
things, the cost to nonuniformity in creditors’ rights).
302. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
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creditors.303 To the extent that an after-acquired property clause is
limited in bankruptcy under section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the value of the property may flow to the unsecured creditors.304 Yet,
this value would not be available to unsecured creditors in the state
court proceeding.
In addition, the state court may have limited jurisdiction if the
business is involved in interstate commerce.305 Although, in theory,
creditors not subject to the state court’s jurisdiction should not be
harmed by its rulings, those creditors would have little recourse in
practice. Moreover, state receivership and ABC laws lack many of
the protections provided to creditors in federal bankruptcy cases,
including extensive noticing provisions;306 protections for qualified
financial contracts;307 protection from the dissipation of the debtor’s
assets by creditors (for example, the creditor invoking the receiver-
ship) not subject to the stay;308 oversight by the U.S. Trustee (or
Bankruptcy Administrator);309 the right to examine the debtor;310
and the potential appointment of a creditors’ committee to monitor
the debtor and represent the interests of the debtor’s general un-
secured creditors.311
Even these few examples of inconsistencies and nuances between
certain state receivership and ABC laws and the Bankruptcy Code
show an actual conflict—state laws facilitating going-concern sales
of businesses “stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
303. See supra notes 255-61 and accompanying text.
304. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a).
305. See, e.g., FRIEDLAND, supra note 236, § 11:2 (“State courts have general subject matter
jurisdiction, but that jurisdiction is confined to the territorial boundaries of the state.”); see
also Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 224 (1863) (“We do not suggest that this or any
State law relating to property possesses extra-territorial force: the legislative sovereignty of
each State is confined to its limits. Beyond these the laws of some other local jurisdiction
prevail.”).
306. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002.
307. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 223-36 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
310. 11 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).
311. See, e.g., id. §§ 1102-1103 (setting forth the appointment of committees and the duties
of committees, respectively). Junior creditors—specifically general unsecured creditors—are
arguably exposed to the greatest level of risk created by deficiencies or variances in state
debtor-creditor laws. See also supra Part II.B (discussing potential conflicts between state and
federal law).
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execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”312 As dis-
cussed above, chapter 11 was designed to help distressed businesses
continue in operation while protecting the rights of that business’s
creditors to the extent possible and consistent with the rehabilita-
tion goal.313 Likewise, the Bankruptcy Clause was intended to
ensure fair and nondiscriminatory treatment of parties in matters
concerning debtor-creditor relations.314 Notably, this latter con-
cern—fair treatment and certainty for creditors—also encouraged
Congress to consolidate the reorganization chapters of the Bank-
ruptcy Act into chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.315 The legislative
history explains, “Under [the Bankruptcy Act], creditors are con-
stantly at the mercy of debtors who may file under two or more
reorganization chapters. Each chapter proceeding has different
rules and affects creditors in a different way.”316 This concern
increases dramatically if creditors are now subject to different
reorganization processes in each of the fifty states.317
Although lower courts considering similar preemption issues have
viewed state receivership and related laws as “complementary” to
the Bankruptcy Code,318 schemes replicating aspects of the Bank-
ruptcy Code that impair creditors’ rights and affect distributions to
creditors go too far and should be treated differently. Allowing a
state law receiver to operate a debtor’s business, benefit from an
automatic and broad stay, assume or reject contracts unilaterally,
and sell the business as a going concern free of all claims, conflicts
with the “fresh start” concept and the related protections for
312. Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (alteration in
original) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also BFP v. Resolution Tr.
Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 567 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]hether or not Congress has used
any special ‘pre-emptive’ language, state regulation must yield to the extent it actually con-
flicts with federal law. This is no less true of laws enacted under Congress’s power to ‘estab-
lish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.’” (omission in original) (quoting U.S.
CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4)).
313. See supra Part II.A.
314. See supra Part I.A.
315. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
316. 124 CONG. REC. 32,420 (1978).
317. See Dawson, supra note 7 (discussing the concern of nonuniformity and its veritable
impact).
318. See, e.g., Ready Fixtures Co. v. Stevens Cabinets, 488 F. Supp. 2d 787, 791 (W.D. Wis.
2007) (holding no preemption of the state receivership statute and noting that the statute
simply provided insolvent debtors with a “simpler, less expensive” alternative to filing for
bankruptcy).
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creditors codified in the Bankruptcy Code.319 As discussed further
below, state legislatures and courts may have the power to grant
relief to entities or assets subject to their jurisdiction, but any such
power is suspended once Congress chooses to act under the Bank-
ruptcy Clause.320 Lower court decisions suggesting otherwise ignore
the practical effects of these state laws and elevate the artificial
label of “discharge” over substance.
3. The Contract Clause
State law schemes that facilitate going-concern reorganization
sales also raise issues under the Contract Clause in cases such as
Sturges v. Crowninshield321 and Ogden v. Saunders.322 For example,
these schemes allow a receiver to alter the parties’ contractual bar-
gain by, among other things, avoiding performance of contractual
obligations—including promises to pay in full and to not assign the
contract, not be subject to an ABC or receivership, and take (or re-
frain from taking) other specified actions. These schemes in turn
arguably violate the Contract Clause.323 Admittedly, the Supreme
Court has gradually increased deference to state legislatures under
the Contract Clause, particularly with respect to the impairment of
319. See supra Part II.A.
320. See infra Part III.B. Notably, Congress knows how to exclude kinds of bankruptcy
from the Bankruptcy Code. For example, Congress chose to remove insurance companies from
federal bankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (2012) (excluding, among others, domestic insur-
ance companies). Accordingly, states can, and do, regulate the insolvency of insurance com-
panies through their receivership laws.
321. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 199 (1819).
322. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 301-04 (1827) (Thompson, J.).
323. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session on H.R. 31 and
H.R. 32 Bankruptcy Act Revision, 94th Cong. 188 (1975) (statement of Professor Frank R.
Kennedy, University of Michigan Law School) (“The impairment of obligation of contract
clause is a limitation only on State legislatures. There is no question about the power of
Congress to provide for a discharge of indebtedness even as to indebtedness incurred before
Congress enacts the Bankruptcy Act.”).
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obligations under private contracts.324 This deference is not, how-
ever, without limits. As the Court has explained,
Yet private contracts are not subject to unlimited modification
under the police power. The Court in Blaisdell recognized that
laws intended to regulate existing contractual relationships
must serve a legitimate public purpose. A State could not “adopt
as its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of con-
tracts or the denial of means to enforce them.”325
A state law that overrides an ipso facto clause, nullifies an anti-
assignment clause, or reduces or limits a claim (for example, by
deeming claims under rejected contracts to be incurred prior to the
receivership) under a private contract falls squarely within this
language.326 As commentators have observed, “State debtor relief
legislation, to be sure, was passed during the economically troubled
period between the end of the Revolution and the framing of the
324. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443-48 (1934). In Blais-
dell, the Supreme Court upheld a state law that extended a homeowner’s redemption period
with respect to mortgage contracts during an economic emergency in the state. Id. at 447.
Although the emergent circumstances were central to the Court’s analysis, subsequent cases
placed less emphasis on the existence of an emergency and gave more deference to state laws
that were reasonable and appropriate to serve a legitimate public purpose. See Douglas W.
Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding,
14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 540-50 (1987) (discussing the original purpose of the Contract
Clause and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the clause, particularly after Blaisdell).
325. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (citation omitted) (quoting
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439).
326. Presumably, states could try to articulate a public purpose. For example, a law
mitigating the effect of an ipso facto clause may increase borrowers’ access to credit. This kind
of justification underlies, in part, amendments to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
that allow certain kinds of collateral to be pledged and, in some instances, transferred despite
contractual language to the contrary. See U.C.C. §§ 9-406 to -409 (AM. LAW INST. 2014). These
provisions in Article 9 are more limited than a general override of ipso facto clauses—they are
a targeted response to an identified concern. It is unclear whether such state laws would
withstand scrutiny under a federal preemption analysis. See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C LAW § 9-408
(McKinney 2017) (addressing assignability of, among other things, general intangibles); id.
at cmt. 9 (“This section does not override federal law to the contrary. However, it does reflect
an important policy judgment that should provide a template for future federal law reforms.”).
This kind of provision is an important policy judgment, one arguably already made under
federal patent and bankruptcy laws. It also is unclear whether this kind of public purpose
would be adequate justification in the face of the Supremacy Clause and the Bankruptcy
Clause. Indeed, a public purpose of overriding ipso facto clauses to facilitate a receiver’s
transfer of an operating business as a going concern directly conflicts with the reservation of
this power to Congress under the Bankruptcy Clause.
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Constitution. Therefore, there is little doubt that such legislation
was one of the major evils that the Clause was designed to eradi-
cate.”327
Consequently, even if Congress had not enacted chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, states still could not impair the parties’ obliga-
tions under creditors’ contracts in this manner, at least not retro-
actively. Likewise, a state should not be able to prospectively affect
contracts governed by the laws of other states.328 The combined
principles of the Bankruptcy Clause and the Contract Clause dem-
onstrate the constitutional infirmities with certain state receiver-
ship and ABC laws, and the need for a more thoughtful analysis of
the appropriate role of such laws in debtor-creditor relations.
B. Historical Police Powers of the States and the Bankruptcy
Clause
The other important consideration in federal preemption analysis
is whether Congress is legislating in an area historically governed
by state law. This factor is more challenging to analyze than it first
appears. A simple response would be that states have long pos-
sessed authority to address debtor-creditor relations and, in fact,
exercised that authority prior to the first federal bankruptcy laws.329
A more nuanced explanation would consider the nature of tradi-
tional state receivership and ABC laws, as well as the significant
federal interest in establishing uniform bankruptcy laws under the
Bankruptcy Clause.330
States undeniably have the power to regulate the debt relations
of, and commercial transactions involving, their residents. As dis-
cussed in Part I, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, many
states had processes in place whereby debtors could relinquish their
assets to creditors in order to be released from prison or perhaps
even to receive a formal discharge. The permissible scope of these
327. Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 324, at 533 (footnote omitted).
328. See supra Part I.C; see also, e.g., Denny v. Bennett, 128 U.S. 489, 498 (1888) (finding
that a state cannot discharge an “extraterritorial” debt); Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 295,
309 (1847) (holding that a Maryland law could not discharge debtor as to contracts governed
by New York law).
329. See supra Parts I.B-C.
330. See supra Parts I.B-C.
2017] RETHINKING PARAMETERS IN BANKRUPTCY 205
laws changed, however, in response to the Bankruptcy Clause and
the Contract Clause. Thereafter, the options available to debtors
and creditors under state law generally were limited to ABCs in
which the debtor’s assets were liquidated to pay creditors, receiver-
ships in which a neutral receiver was appointed to preserve or
dispose of an asset or wind down a business, or a consensual
composition.331
Even as states’ ABC and receivership laws progressed, most state
law schemes were structured as a creditor collection mechanism.332
The assignee or receiver would preserve the value of the assets, and
then sell those assets, for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. Most
of these sales proceeded as liquidations. In these liquidations, state
law may permit the sale free of liens, to the extent lienholders
received proper notice and the sale otherwise complied with applic-
able state law.333 These sales did not necessarily involve the sale of
a debtor’s business as an operating entity (or going concern), the
unilateral assumption and assignment of contracts, or state court
orders that enjoined all parties from pursuing claims, including
successor liability claims, against the business assets.334
331. See supra Parts I.C-D.
332. See, e.g., FRIEDLAND, supra note 236, § 11.1 (“In most states, the right to seek the
appointment of a receiver is ancillary to, and therefore must arise out of, the primary claims
asserted in the lawsuit. In its broadest application, a court may appoint a receiver to take
possession of, manage, dissolve and liquidate the entire business and assets of a defendant
for distribution to the defendant’s creditors and interest holders.” (footnote omitted)); see also
James E. McCarty, Federal Bankruptcy or State Court Receivership, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 340,
342 (1965) (explaining when a state law receivership may be allowed to proceed notwith-
standing a federal bankruptcy case, and noting that “bankruptcy does not supersede a state
court proceeding for the enforcement of a lien and the appointment of a receiver therein where
the institution of the suit created a valid lien or was for the enforcement of a valid existing
lien obtained more than four months prior to bankruptcy”).
333. For example, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides a means for selling
a secured creditor’s collateral free of junior liens. See, e.g., Regina Stango Kelbon & Jillian
Zvolensky, A Look at the Friendly Foreclosure Option, LAW360 (June 2, 2015, 11:02 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/660707/a-look-at-the-friendly-foreclosure-option [https://
perma.cc/8A7Z-T49G] (explaining mechanics of foreclosure sales under Article 9).
334. States take different approaches to successor liability in the asset sale context, but
have traditionally considered different factors to assess a purchaser’s potential liability. For
a concise description of the different approaches to successor liability under state law, see
John H. Matheson, Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371, 383-93 (2011) (describing vari-
ous exceptions to the no liability rule in the asset sale context, including the de facto merger
and continuation of business doctrines); see also, e.g., Martin Hilti Family Tr. v. Knoedler
Gallery, LLC, 137 F. Supp. 3d 430, 455-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining elements of successor
liability under New York and Delaware law). In addition, the fact that some state courts may
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The evolution of state receivership and ABC laws to a point where
they mimic the Bankruptcy Code and facilitate a fresh start for a
debtor’s business assets has been gradual, with some acceleration
in the past twenty years.335 These changes appear to be driven by
several factors, including practices in federal equity receiverships
and perceived deficiencies in the Bankruptcy Code.336 The latter
factor is discussed more fully in Part III.D.
Parties have used federal equity receiverships with varying fre-
quency since the late 1800s.337 Federal equity receiverships emerged
as a way to help save distressed railroads and offered a template for
the early composition schemes incorporated into federal bankruptcy
laws.338 A federal equity receivership generally allows a distressed
railroad or business to submit to the jurisdiction of the federal dis-
trict court, negotiate a plan with certain creditor groups, and receive
court approval of that plan, which often extinguished junior claims
and, in some cases, equity interests.339 The railroad or business
would continue under completely new, or partially new, ownership
after the receivership.340 Notably, a federal court overseeing a feder-
al equity receivership case does not face the same Contract Clause
or federal preemption issues confronting state legislatures and
courts.341
have permitted state law receivers or assignees to sell assets free of liabilities, terminate
existing contracts, or otherwise exercise powers beyond selling the debtor’s assets and distrib-
uting the proceeds to creditors does not change the analysis concerning whether those
expanded rights and powers are advisable from a practical perspective or permissible from
a constitutional perspective. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 4-5 (Cal. 1977) (California
law); Vill. Builders 96, L.P. v. U.S. Labs., Inc., 112 P.3d 1082, 1084 (Nev. 2005) (Nevada law);
Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc. 431 A.2d 811, 812 (N.J. 1981) (New Jersey law).
335. See supra Parts II.B-C.
336. See, e.g., Timothy F. Nixon, Bankruptcy Sale Orders vs. Receivership Sale Orders,
LAW360 (Apr. 7, 2010, 12:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/159938/bankruptcy-sale-
orders-vs-receivership-sale-orders [https://perma.cc/XSX7-KFDR] (“Receiverships are rapidly
becoming a preferred alternative legal process for selling assets as the cost of bankruptcy con-
tinues to escalate.”).
337. See Tabb, supra note 20, at 21-23.
338. See id.
339. See Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1440-53 (2004).
340. See id.
341. Federal law generally governs federal equity receiverships. For example, Rule 66 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explains,
These rules govern an action in which the appointment of a receiver is sought
or a receiver sues or is sued. But the practice in administering an estate by a
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Any reliance by states on federal equity receiverships to support
the scope of their state receivership or ABC laws is misplaced. Al-
though the objectives of the states to provide greater flexibility and
options for distressed businesses within their borders are laudable,
they must give way to federal bankruptcy laws. The Bankruptcy
Clause authorizes Congress to regulate the field of bankruptcy; Con-
gress’s adoption of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code leaves little,
if any, room for states to legislate in that space.342
Importantly, this analysis does not suggest that all aspects of
state receivership or ABC laws are preempted. State debtor-
creditors laws provide important alternatives and protections for
parties involved in distressed situations. Creditors should have an
efficient and effective means for foreclosing on their collateral.343
Likewise, debtors should have a state law option to liquidate their
assets for the benefit of creditors.344 Moreover, sales of a debtor’s
assets may be free of liens (and in the context of real property,
redemption rights) in the creditors’ collateral to the extent provided
by state law.345 That has long been the practice and utility of state
debtor-creditors laws.
These traditional and ongoing valuable uses of state debtor-
creditor laws are very different from current trends. State receiver-
ships or ABC laws that allow either the debtor or secured creditors
to transfer the debtor’s business as an operating entity (or going
concern) free of existing obligations and without counterparty
consents exceed the traditional bounds of receiverships, and pose
receiver or a similar court-appointed officer must accord with the historical prac-
tice in federal courts or with a local rule.
FED. R. CIV. P. 66. In addition, the federal courts generally recognize a federal common law
on receivership. See, e.g., Can. Life Assurance Co. v. LaPeter, 563 F.3d 837, 842-43 (9th Cir.
2009). Moreover, a federal statute addresses the sale of assets in federal court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2001 (2012). Finally, the Contract Clause does not fetter the impairment of contracts in a
federal equity receivership. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
342. See supra Part I.A.
343. See, e.g., FRIEDLAND, supra note 236, § 11:1 (explaining general utility of state law
receiverships).
344. See id.
345. See, e.g., id., at Preliminary Materials (“Whether a court can or will approve a receiver
sale free and clear of liens and interests remains a highly debated and, in many states, an
open issue.”); Baruch Kreiman, Survey of the Rights of Receiverships to Sell Real Property, 8
J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 257, 263 (2014) (examining, among other things, situations
in which states permit receiver sales free of redemption rights).
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significant risk to junior creditors, contract parties, employees, and
other stakeholders.346 Accordingly, although states have an interest
in regulating the affairs of debtors and creditors within their
borders, those interests must give way to the extent they impede
significant federal interests. 
C. Modernizing Preemption Analysis Under the Bankruptcy
Clause
In addition to recognizing the breadth of the term “discharge”
under the Supreme Court’s preemption precedent, a strong argu-
ment exists to rethink the phrase “subject of Bankruptcies”347 and
whether it should be limited to discharge and related concepts.
Business and financial markets are significantly different than
those in existence when the Supreme Court first considered the
scope of the Bankruptcy Clause. Markets are more sophisticated,
more global, and even more dependent on the certainty of law.
Variances in law—whether expected or unexpected—can cause loss-
es for some and unwarranted windfalls for others.348 They also can
increase the cost of doing business in the United States, as contract
parties increase rates to compensate for legal changes or vari-
ances.349
The commerce objectives underlying the Bankruptcy Clause
should serve as a guidepost to interpreting the phrase “subject of
Bankruptcies.” Under this approach, the Supreme Court’s language
in International Shoe is particularly relevant.350 As discussed above,
the Court observed,
346. See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
347. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
348. For a general discussion of the costs of legal uncertainty for businesses, see Oliver
Budzinski, Modern Industrial Economics: Open Problems and Possible Limits, in COMPETI-
TION POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC APPROACH: FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 111, 127 (Josef
Drexl et al. eds., 2011).
349. See id.; see also Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Market Economies and Rule of Law, Speech at the 2003 Financial Markets Conference of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Apr. 4, 2003), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2003/20030404/default.htm [https://perma.cc/3MWF-RJLM] (“As societies and
economies evolve, the details of the law, though generally not its fundamental principles, need
to change. But any uncertainty about the clarity and fixity of the law adds to the risk of trade,
which as I noted, is reflected in a higher real cost of capital.”).
350. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 266 (1929).
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It is clear that the provisions of the Arkansas law governing the
distribution of property of insolvents for the payment of their
debts and providing for their discharge, or that otherwise relate
to the subject of bankruptcies, are within the field entered by
Congress when it passed the Bankruptcy Act.351
The Court’s language acknowledges at least two fundamental bank-
ruptcy principles covered by the Bankruptcy Clause: equitable
distribution of property (key from the creditor perspective) and
discharge (key from the debtor perspective).352 It also contemplates
additional principles with the reference to “or that otherwise relate
to the subject of bankruptcies.”
In Sherwood Partners, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the
Court’s language in International Shoe encompassed not only
discharges, but also rights and powers given specifically to bank-
ruptcy trustees (or debtors in possession under section 1107) by
Congress under the Bankruptcy Code.353 The Ninth Circuit focused
its analysis on rights and powers not available to state law assign-
ees or receivers—at least not available at the time of the enactment
of the Bankruptcy Code.354 For example, the Bankruptcy Code auth-
orizes a bankruptcy trustee to avoid preferential payments made to
certain creditors prior to the bankruptcy filing.355 This is not a
creditor-specific right transferred to the trustee once a bankruptcy
case is filed. Rather, it is a bankruptcy-specific right created by the
Bankruptcy Code.356 A bankruptcy trustee’s powers with respect to,
among other things, contracts and leases (including labor contracts),
utility obligations, the automatic stay, and broad “free and clear”
351. Id. (emphasis added).
352. Id. The Ninth Circuit also recognized these two fundamental principles in Sherwood
Partners, explaining (in the context of chapter 7) that the Bankruptcy Code “embodies two
ideals: (1) giving the individual debtor a fresh start, by giving him a discharge of most of his
debts; and (2) equitably distributing a debtor’s assets among competing creditors.” Sherwood
Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005)  (citing Stellwagen v. Clum,
245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918)) (further observing that “these two goals are separate and operate
somewhat independently of each other” (citing 1 COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 198,
¶ 1.03[2][a])).
353. See Sherwood Partners, 394 F.3d at 1204-05.
354. See id.
355. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)-(c) (2012).
356. See Sherwood Partners, 394 F.3d at 1204-05.
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sales are similarly bankruptcy-specific. An individual creditor could
not exercise these powers under state statutory law and, at least
prior to recent changes to state receivership laws, neither could a
state law assignee or receiver.357
Rights or powers appropriately unique to federal bankruptcy laws
should qualify as a federal law “on the subject of Bankruptcies.”358
The fact that a state copies or replicates those aspects of the
Bankruptcy Code should not change the analysis. Such an approach
would allow states to define that constitutional phrase and the re-
sulting federal preemption doctrine. Congress has chosen to exercise
its powers under the Bankruptcy Clause, and the Bankruptcy Code
should serve as the only source of bankruptcy laws.359 There is no
meaningful reason to limit the term “subject of Bankruptcies” to
formal discharges when doing so undercuts the purpose and utility
of the Bankruptcy Clause.360 It is time for parties and courts to
adopt a more holistic approach to the phrase and find a more
appropriate balance between what constitutes federal laws on the
subject of bankruptcies and what is a valid state law on debtor-
creditor relations.
357. See, e.g., id. at 1205 (“We believe that statutes that give state assignees or trustees
avoidance powers beyond those that may be exercised by individual creditors trench too close
upon the exercise of the federal bankruptcy power.”). Admittedly, some state courts have
authorized receivers to exercise powers beyond collecting, preserving, and liquidating a
debtor’s assets. Courts typically invoke their equitable powers in such cases, and may not
raise exactly the same issues as a state statutory scheme granting such powers. Nonetheless,
as discussed supra notes 331-32, state equity receiverships may pose problems as well.
358. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
359. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 266 (1929); Moskowitz v. Prentice (In
re Wis. Builders Supply Co.), 239 F.2d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 1956) (examining the Supreme
Court’s language in International Shoe and concluding that state law general assignments
were permissible to an extent and striking one aspect of the Wisconsin statute at issue
because it was “as broad and comprehensive as Section 3 of the Bankruptcy Act”).
360. See, e.g., Sherwood Partners, 394 F.3d at 1203 (“What goes for state discharge provi-
sions also holds true for state statutes that implicate the federal bankruptcy law’s other major
goal, namely equitable distribution. Bankruptcy law accomplishes equitable distribution
through a distinctive form of collective proceeding. This is a unique contribution of the
Bankruptcy Code that makes bankruptcy different from a collection of actions by individual
creditors.”).
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D. Why the Status Quo Is Unacceptable
Some observers may believe that the suggested constitutional
infirmities with certain state receivership and ABC laws are much
ado about nothing. If a state law can provide a sale reorganization
alternative for business debtors, why should federal law impede
that progress? This narrow perspective has several shortcomings.
State receivership or ABC laws that facilitate a transfer of a
debtor’s business as a going concern free of existing obligations and
without counterparty consent jeopardize the rights of creditors,
create variances in business bankruptcy laws, and likely increase
the cost of doing business for all companies, regardless of size or
financial condition.361 That said, putting aside the constitutional
concerns addressed above, perhaps the benefits to individual state
sale reorganization processes outweigh the risks. States do have an
interest in providing debt relief to individuals and businesses domi-
ciled in their states. But do they need to provide the extensive relief
evidenced by recent amendments to state laws? In most cases, a
business could liquidate or sell its assets as a going concern without
the provisions that facilitate the kind of bankruptcy fresh start dis-
cussed above.362 Indeed, state commercial laws have long provided
for the sale of property free of some liens.363 To the extent that a
purchaser desires greater protection from claimants, the assignment
of particular contracts or leases, or a renegotiation of utilities or
similar obligations existing at the time of the sale, the purchaser (or
361. See supra Parts III.A-B; see also supra notes 8 (discussing potential issues with state
debtor-creditor laws, particularly for unsecured creditors) and 26 (discussing the meaning of
counterparty consent in this context).
362. Receivers historically have dissolved businesses and, in some instances, sold them at
auction to facilitate the payment of creditors. Likewise, creditors often can obtain similar re-
sults under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., FRIEDLAND, supra note 236,
§ 1:5 (“It is not uncommon for lenders with blanket liens on all of a borrower’s assets to sell
them as a package as a going concern or operating entity. Although these sales are often
conducted on an ‘as is, where is’ basis with few, if any, representations and warranties, they
have increased in popularity over the last few years.”).
363. For a thoughtful explanation of why state law sales of a going concern may not be a
complete “free and clear” sale—at least under traditional state law principles—see Douglas
G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 786-87
(2002). But see Gibbons & Grimes, supra note 263, at 51, 78 (asserting that receivers are able
to sell property free and clear without the consent of all lienholders, with some caveats, and
acknowledging there is case law to the contrary).
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the receiver) can negotiate acceptable terms with counterparties.364
Consensual out-of-court workouts are an important component of
business restructurings and should be encouraged.
To the extent a business debtor, receiver, assignee, or purchaser
desires more—say a nonconsensual restructuring—the business
should invoke the federal bankruptcy laws. If the Bankruptcy Code
no longer is providing an effective reorganization option for busi-
nesses, Congress should amend the Code.365 The courts and Con-
gress should not allow states (or the parties) to craft workarounds
to any perceived deficiencies in the Code. That kind of ad hoc reform
not only exposes parties to uncertainty and unfair treatment, but it
also undercuts significantly the value of a national bankruptcy law
and the role of the Supremacy Clause, the Bankruptcy Clause, and
the Contract Clause.
Notably, prominent figures in the bankruptcy profession have
called for the reform of chapter 11.366 A commission formed by the
American Bankruptcy Institute in December 2011 studied the many
aspects of chapter 11 for three years, and issued an extensive final
report identifying weaknesses in chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
and suggesting principles for reform.367 The commission’s report
discussed the changes in chapter 11 cases and the challenges facing
distressed businesses that file a chapter 11 case.368 These challenges
include the cost and complexity of chapter 11 and the need for
different tools to assist business debtors in their restructuring
efforts.369 The report also noted that the Code continues to work for
364. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
365. Several commentators suggest that the increasing use of state law receiverships
relates to frustrations with, and concerns about, the Bankruptcy Code’s effectiveness, par-
ticularly for smaller companies. See, e.g., Lucey, supra note 7, at 12 (“The impression is
widespread that federal bankruptcy court has been less effective in recent years as a tool for
maximizing net-asset values, particularly when it comes to situations requiring the expedi-
tious sale of a small business as a going concern.”); ABI Commission Report, supra note 182,
at 299-303 (explaining that witnesses before the commission testified that the Bankruptcy
Code no longer worked for small- and middle-market companies and that, as a result,
companies were increasingly turning to state law receiverships and ABCs).
366. See ABI Commission Report, supra note 182, at 4-6.
367. See id. at 12-19.
368. See id. at 12-19, 297-312.
369. See id. at 12 (“Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that chapter 11 has become too
expensive (particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises) and is no longer capable of
achieving certain policy objectives such as stimulating economic growth, preserving jobs and
tax bases at both the state and federal level, or helping to rehabilitate viable companies that
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some businesses, but with appropriate reforms, it could work much
better for all businesses.370
States trying to provide a more effective reorganization option for
businesses by amending their receivership or ABC laws miss the
mark. Those laws weaken business bankruptcy laws by creating
variances and opportunities for parties in control of the debtor
(whether the company or senior creditors) to pick and choose, per-
haps even manipulate, reorganization laws based on what best suits
their particular interests. A strong, uniform federal bankruptcy law
is vital to sustaining a robust national economy in a global market-
place.371 Policymakers and courts should not permit individual
states or parties to undermine that objective.
CONCLUSION
The United States has long been the global leader in business
reorganization laws.372 That status stems, in large part, from the
innovative business reorganization laws of chapter 11 that apply
nationally. Both foreign and domestic creditors doing business with
U.S. companies know the rules of the game, and they rely on these
uniform, national rules in negotiating and pricing their commercial
transactions with U.S. companies.
The evolution and expanding scope of certain states’ debtor-
creditor laws threaten this landscape. State laws that facilitate the
transfer of a debtor’s business as an operating entity (or going con-
cern) free of existing obligations, and without counterparty con-
sents, jeopardize the rights of creditors and other stakeholders af-
fected by a distressed business.373 Those laws also directly govern
the subject of bankruptcies in violation of the Bankruptcy Clause.374
Policymakers and courts need to rebalance the allocation of powers
between Congress and the states with respect to bankruptcy laws.
They need to define more clearly the parameters of federal preemp-
tion and preserve Congress’s exclusive authority over laws affecting
cannot afford a chapter 11 reorganization.”).
370. See id.
371. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
372. See supra Part I.
373. See supra Parts III.A-B.
374. See supra Parts III.A-B.
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the rights of creditors and other stakeholders in the context of a
fresh start for business debtors.
That said, state debtor-creditor laws provide meaningful relief for
creditors trying to collect defaulted obligations and debtors needing
to liquidate assets to pay creditors.375 They likewise can form the
basis of negotiated, consensual debt resolutions.376 If a creditor vol-
untarily agrees to relinquish or diminish its rights, state law and
public policy should support that result. State laws should not,
however, force or compel that result—even if it is not labeled a dis-
charge. Recognizing the appropriate roles of federal and state laws
in the context of debtor-creditor relations will enhance certainty and
value for all stakeholders.
375. See supra Part II.B.
376. See supra Part III.D.
